The manifold effects of partisan media on viewers' beliefs and attitudes: A field experiment with Fox News viewers*

David E. Broockman† Joshua L. Kalla‡

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Abstract

Partisan media impacts voting behavior, yet what changes in viewers' beliefs or attitudes may underlie these impacts is poorly understood. We recruited a sample of regular Fox News viewers using data on actual TV viewership from a media company, and incentivized them to watch CNN instead for a month using real-time viewership quizzes. Despite regular Fox viewers being largely strong partisans, we found manifold effects of changing the slant of their media diets on their factual beliefs, attitudes, perceptions of issues' importance, and overall political views. We show that these effects stem in part from a bias we call partisan coverage filtering, wherein partisan outlets selectively report information, leading viewers to learn a biased set of facts. Consistent with this, treated participants concluded that Fox concealed negative information about President Trump. Partisan media does not only present its side an electoral advantage—it may present a challenge for democratic accountability.

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†Associate Professor, Travers Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley. dbroockman@berkeley.edu, https://polisci.berkeley.edu/people/person/david-broockman

‡Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and Department of Statistics and Data Science, Yale University. josh.kalla@yale.edu, https://joshuakalla.com.

The impact of partisan media has drawn considerable concern from social scientists and civil society (e.g., Benkler, Faris and Roberts 2018; Druckman, Levendusky and McLain 2018). Natural experiments indicate that partisan media meaningfully affects voting behavior, impacting elections (Ash et al. 2021; DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Martin and Yurukoglu 2017; Hopkins and Ladd 2014). However, we know little about what changes in viewers' beliefs, attitudes, or priorities may underlie these shifts in voting behavior, leaving the effects of partisan media—and its implications for democracy—paradoxically "well-known but poorly understood" (Yglesias 2018, p. 682-3).

In this paper, we argue that partisan media has manifold effects on its viewers' beliefs and attitudes through multiple processes of influence. In particular, we argue that partisan media engages in both traditionally-emphasized forms of media influence (agenda setting and framing) as well as a form of influence we call *partisan coverage filtering*. Agenda setting refers to how higher volumes of media coverage on a topic "change the problems the viewing public regards as. . . important" (Iyengar and Kinder 1987, p. 16) and primes viewers' pre-existing attitudes on that topic when evaluating politicians (Krosnick and Kinder 1990). Research on partisan media has argued that partisan media also *frames* "the same event[s]" in a "one-sided" way (Levendusky 2013, p. 2-3) (e.g., describing a policy as 'welfare' instead of 'aid to the poor'), changing which considerations are salient to its viewers. We argue partisan media also engage in an underappreciated practice we call *partisan coverage filtering*: selectively reporting information about selectively chosen topics, causing its viewers to *learn* more information favorable to the network's partisan side and potentially changing viewers' attitudes and political evaluations as a result.

We support our argument with a unique field experiment and an associated content analysis. Our experiment incentivized Fox News viewers to watch CNN instead during September 2020. We first present results from a content analysis of Fox News and CNN during this period that demonstrates substantial differences in what topics the networks cover (agenda setting), what information they give viewers (partisan coverage filtering), and how they frame this information. For example, during this period, CNN provided extensive coverage of COVID-19, which included

information about the severity of the COVID-19 crisis and poor aspects of Trump's performance handling COVID-19. Fox News covered COVID-19 much less. The coverage of COVID-19 it did offer provided little of the information CNN did, instead giving viewers information about why the virus was not a serious threat. On the other hand, Fox News extensively but highly selectively covered racial issues, and its coverage of these issues provided extensive information about Biden and other Democrats' supposed positions on them and about outbreaks of violence at protests for racial justice in American cities. CNN provided little information about either. The networks both covered the issue of voting by mail, but again covered dramatically different information about it (in addition to offering different frames).

How would viewing networks with such different content affect viewers' beliefs and attitudes? It is far from obvious that it would at all. Indeed, influential theories would suggest that partisan media's effects will be limited because those who choose to watch it already have strong views (for review, see Arceneaux and Johnson 2013; Prior 2013*b*), or might resist any information contrary to their partisan preferences or from outpartisan sources (e.g., Zaller 1992). However, existing research has not measured the effects of sustained exposure to televised partisan media on individuals' beliefs and attitudes (for experiments on the effects of online media exposure, see, e.g., Searles et al. 2021; Guess et al. 2021).

To assess these questions, we conducted a randomized field experiment that changed the slant of partisan media viewers' media diets. To do so, we first partnered with a media analytics company to recruit individuals to a survey panel who regularly watch Fox News, as identified in data on their households' actual television viewership. At baseline, these Fox News viewers were nearly all very conservative and strong Republicans. Of 763 qualifying participants, we then randomized 40% to a treatment group. To change the slant of their media diet, we offered treatment group participants $15 per hour to watch up to 7 hours of CNN per week during September 2020, prioritizing the hours at which participants indicated they typically watched Fox News. We enforced compliance with viewership quizzes (e.g., about which guest had just appeared), described in more detail below.

Compliance with watching CNN was high in the treatment group; the median participant correctly answered 14 of the 15 quiz questions we asked over the course of the five quizzes.

Starting three days after the incentivized viewership period ended, 744 of the 763 study participants answered a follow-up survey. Consistent with partisan coverage filtering, we found substantial learning: in this follow-up survey we found large effects of watching CNN instead of Fox News on participants' factual perceptions of current events (i.e., beliefs) and knowledge about the 2020 presidential candidates' positions. We find both large decreases in knowledge of information covered on Fox News during the incentivized period and large increases in knowledge of information CNN covered during this period, indicating that both substitution away from Fox News and substitution towards CNN occurred and impacted viewers' beliefs. We also found substantial evidence for agenda setting, as treated participants were much more likely to see issues covered on CNN (COVID-19) instead of on Fox News (racial protests) as important.

Accompanying these shifts, we also found evidence of manifold effects on viewers' attitudes about current events, policy preferences, and evaluations of key political figures and parties. For example, we found large effects on attitudes and policy preferences about COVID-19. We also found changes in evaluations of Donald Trump and Republican candidates and elected officials. Although our evidence on the mechanism for the effects on viewers' attitudes is more tentative, our evidence suggests traditional accounts of media influence (i.e., other than partisan coverage filtering) alone cannot fully explain them. Finally, consistent with participants underestimating the extent of partisan media's bias at baseline, treatment group participants became more likely to agree that if Donald Trump made a mistake, Fox News would not cover it—i.e., that Fox News engages in partisan coverage filtering. We also found no evidence of impacts on outcomes measuring topics not directly covered on either network, such as support for democratic norms.

We elaborate two broader implications of our findings. First, our results contrast with conventional wisdom that Americans—and especially highly engaged partisans—reject information contrary to their partisan loyalties and from opposing sources (e.g., Zaller 1992). Indeed, our ex-

periment arguably represented a hard test of partisan media's impact. Consistent with theories of selective exposure, the participants in our study—regular Fox News viewers at baseline—were overwhelmingly strongly conservative and politically engaged. Yet, we still found that these highly engaged partisans could be persuaded by viewing opposition partisan media instead of their own.

Second, our results indicate challenges that partisan media may pose for democratic accountability. Our findings suggest that partisan media may affect voters' choices at least in part because it hides information about aligned incumbents' failures and distorts perceptions of political rivals. This suggests that partisan media does not only present a challenge for the opposing party, it may present a challenge for democracy which may deserve attention from policymakers.

We also conducted an endline survey several weeks later that found these impacts largely receded as treated participants primarily returned to their prior viewership habits. Our finding that participants' attitudes meaningfully shifted at first away from and then back towards their partisan side along with changes in their viewership behavior accord with Ladd and Lenz's (2009) conclusion that "stable elite communication flows" in the media, "rather than any inherent durability of public preferences," may explain why public opinion is typically so resistant to change (p. 405).

We expand on these ideas in the conclusion.

Theoretical Framework

We distinguish between two mechanisms for media influence prior research on traditional media has emphasized, agenda setting and framing, as well as a third mechanism that has received less emphasis in the literature but we argue is important for understanding partisan media, *partisan coverage filtering*. These mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, and we argue partisan media engages in all of them. Table 1 provides an overview of these constructs.

First, reigning theories of media influence argue that a primary mechanism by which the media influences public opinion is through *agenda setting* (McCombs and Shaw 1972). "The idea of

agenda setting is that the public's . . . beliefs about what is a significant issue or event are determined by the amount of news coverage accorded" to those events (Ansolabehere, Behr and Iyengar 1993, p. 142). In other words, more news coverage of a topic leads viewers to conclude that the topic is "important" (Iyengar and Kinder 1987, p. 16). In addition, this is also thought to make viewers bring those topics to mind when evaluating elected officials through a process of *priming* (Krosnick and Kinder 1990). For example, suppose a Republican President launches a new military conflict. Viewers might conclude that the conflict must be important if the media devotes so much attention to it (Miller and Krosnick 2000), and then might also base their overall evaluations of the President on their views of how she is handling the conflict.

A second potential mechanism is framing. Although definitions of framing vary, we follow definitions of framing as entailing "*emphasizing* which aspect" of a given issue is "relevant for evaluating it" (Leeper and Slothuus 2020, p. 154), in turn changing which considerations are salient to viewers. For example, describing civilian deaths in a military conflict as "collateral damage" instead of "deaths of unarmed women and children" might bring to mind different considerations, affecting levels of support for the conflict. Framing is arguably the primary reason previous literature has hypothesized partisan media persuades (Levendusky 2013). Indeed, as Groeling (2013, p. 134) reviews, the "vast majority of the media bias literature" focuses on this "presentation bias," or how media outlets alter their presentations of the same events and information. Consistent with this, previous laboratory- and survey-based experiments have typically measured the impacts of partisan media's use of different frames when covering *the same events* (for discussion, see Searles et al. 2021).

We argue that, while partisan media may engage in framing and agenda-setting, partisan media also engage in a practice we call *partisan coverage filtering*. When engaging in partisan coverage filtering, media outlets add an additional criteria in deciding what *information* to report in the first place: they are more likely to report information flattering to politicians and causes on their ideological or partisan side, or to decline to report information unflattering to the same. In other words,

Table 1: Overview of Theoretical Constructs

Theoretical Construct	**Media's Action**	**Effect on Viewers**	**Hypothetical Example**
Agenda Setting	A network **covers a topic more**, holding constant the information conveyed about that topic.	This leads viewers to **see this topic as *more important*** and to ***priming* viewers' *pre-existing* attitudes on this topic** when forming political evaluations.	A Republican President launches a new military conflict. Media outlets cover the new conflict every day, leading viewers to see the conflict as important and to base their evaluations of the President on how they think she is handling the conflict.
Framing	A network "provides an interpretation of an issue or policy by *emphasizing* which aspect of the issue is relevant for evaluating it, *without the frame itself [providing] any new substantive information about the issue*" (Leeper and Slothuus 2020, p.154, emphasis in original)	This leads viewers to think about the issue in a different way, **changing which considerations are salient** to them.	**CNN** refers to local militias fighting back against the US as "freedom fighters," while **Fox News** refers to them as "terrorists." **CNN** refers to civilian casualties as "deaths of unarmed women and children," while **Fox News** refers to them as "collateral damage." When thinking about the conflict, viewers then bring to mind related considerations (e.g., the need to fight terrorists), affecting levels of support for the conflict.
Partisan Coverage Filtering	A network **selectively reports particular information about selectively chosen topics** in a manner that conveys additional information favorable to their partisan or ideological side while omitting unfavorable information.	This leads viewers to ***learn* more information favorable to the network's partisan side**, which could ***change* viewers' attitudes and political evaluations**.	**CNN** gives extensive information about the cost of the conflict, the number of US soldiers who died, and civilian casualties. **Fox News** gives equally extensive information about the severity of the threat that the President's military campaign neutralized and anecdotes of civilians who have greeted US soldiers as liberators. This leaves viewers of each network with different factual understandings of the conflict, and subsequently different levels of support for the conflict and the President.

they selectively cover particular information but not other information in a manner that conveys more information favorable to a network's partisan or ideological side and neglects information unfavorable to its side. In turn, we hypothesize that this will lead viewers to *learn* more information favorable to the network's side, which could change viewers' attitudes and political evaluations. For example, Fox News might not even choose to disclose civilian deaths that occurred due to a Republican President's military campaign, instead focusing on providing viewers information about the severity of the threat and anecdotes of US soldiers being greeted as liberators. CNN could instead give viewers information about the human and financial costs of the conflict.

Partisan coverage filtering is different from agenda setting. Agenda setting concerns how the amount of coverage on a topic affects that topic's importance to viewers, while partisan coverage filtering concerns how selective reporting of information leads to learning and attitude change. For instance, CNN and Fox News could give equal *amounts* of coverage to the military conflict while still giving viewers different information about it. This would be an example of partisan coverage filtering, not agenda setting, as agenda setting begins with different amounts of coverage.

Partisan coverage filtering is also different than framing. Framing concerns presenting the same information but emphasizing different aspects, whereas partisan coverage filtering entails presenting different information entirely. If CNN were to describe information about civilian deaths, leading voters to learn that many civilians had died, but Fox News did not, this would be an example of partisan coverage filtering (e.g., Baum and Groeling 2008). However, if CNN and Fox News both covered civilian deaths but used different language to describe them ("collateral damage" versus "deaths of unarmed women and children"), this would be an example of framing.

The literature on media effects in political science has not given much emphasis to selective reporting of information, what we call partisan coverage filtering, as a potential mechanism for media's effects. Researchers have used different terms to refer to this and related ideas,[1] but

[1]Groeling (2013) uses the term "selection bias" or "partisan selection bias." Grossman, Margalit and Mitts (2022) uses the term "facts bias." In economics, Gentzkow, Shapiro and Stone (2016) describe what they call "filtering bias." There are also related models (e.g., Besley and Prat 2006).

evidence on this form of media influence is scarce (for exceptions, see Baum and Groeling 2008; Grossman, Margalit and Mitts 2022; Puglisi and Snyder 2011).[2]

To the extent that partisan coverage filtering is an important feature of partisan media's influence, this has worrying implications for democratic accountability. As we show below, CNN and Fox News engage in tremendous filtering of which information they present to viewers, even about the same topics and events. For example, Fox News largely did not inform viewers of Trump's failure to protect the US from the COVID-19 outbreak, whereas CNN extensively did so. This is concerning for democratic accountability. The information media outlets give voters plays a central role in helping voters hold elected officials accountable (e.g., Garz and Martin 2021; Hopkins and Pettingill 2018; Snyder and Strömberg 2010). By the same token, hiding information from voters can undermine their ability to hold their elected officials accountable (Besley and Prat 2006). How can a voter hold a politician accountable for an act of malfeasance if they do not know it occurred? Or, alternatively, how can voters reward an outpartisan politician for good performance if their chosen media network does not inform them of it?

At the same time, it is by no means obvious that partisan coverage filtering would impact viewers' beliefs—or even that partisan media would have effects on viewers' attitudes (via any mechanism). Indeed, important perspectives in recent research have expressed skepticism about the influence of partisan media at all. First, many scholars argue that partisan media's impact is limited by the fact that those who watch it tend to have strong views to begin with and so will be especially resistant to persuasion (for a review, see Prior 2013*b*). Second, people may be expected to simply reject information contrary to their prior viewpoints, or from sources they do not trust (Zaller 1992). Third, one might expect viewers to be aware of partisan media's bias and appropriately discount or adjust for it (for review, see Little 2017). Prior survey- and laboratory-based

[2]For instance, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) note that "We are not aware of any systematic empirical evidence on the relative prevalence of these forms of bias" (p. 626) and Levendusky (2013) likewise speculates that partisan media may lead people to "different factual beliefs" but that "existing evidence cannot really draw definitive conclusions about this" (p. 145). However, observational evidence has found that partisan media viewers are aware of very different facts than other citizens (Barabas and Jerit 2009; Schroeder and Stone 2015).

experiments support this skepticism, finding that exposing individuals to clips of partisan instead of non-partisan media has limited effects among those who prefer partisan media (Arceneaux and Johnson 2013; de Benedictis-Kessner et al. 2019; Stroud 2011). Although natural experiments find longer-run exposure to partisan media has meaningful effects on vote choice (e.g., Martin and Yurukoglu 2017),[3] it is unclear what if any changes in beliefs and attitudes may underlie these changes—making the implications of these findings for democratic accountability murky.

Our experiment and content analysis demonstrates considerable agenda setting and partisan coverage filtering in partisan media, and more generally chronicles the manifold effects of partisan media on its viewers' beliefs and attitudes.

Experimental Design

Experimental Comparison: Incentivizing Frequent Fox News Viewers to Watch CNN

In the fall of 2020, we conducted a pre-registered, randomized experiment to measure the effect of replacing Fox News viewership with CNN viewership among frequent Fox News viewers.

In Online Appendix Section 4 we discuss why we chose this experimental design over other possible alternatives. In brief, we had sufficient budget to test only one treatment arm. We chose to prioritize studying the effect of replacing Fox News viewership with CNN viewership among Fox News viewers because we thought it was the best test of partisan coverage filtering. A central implication of our argument is that partisan media should conceal information about aligned incumbents from viewers that viewers would otherwise obtain and would impact viewers' beliefs if viewers consumed alternative media. Given we conducted this experiment while Donald Trump was pres-

[3]See also evidence from a variety of other contexts about the persuasive power of media, a literature too extensive to review here (e.g., Grossman, Margalit and Mitts 2022; Paluck 2009). We also do not review the related literature on exclusively online and social media, important in its own right yet distinct from our main focus (e.g., Guess et al. 2021; Levy 2021; Searles et al. 2021).

ident, we thought the best test of this hypothesis would be to shift participants from a source we hypothesized concealed information about incumbent performance (Fox News) to a source that we hypothesized would provide them that information (CNN). Had there been a Democratic incumbent president at the time, we would have used the opposite design since we would still expect both CNN and Fox News to engage in partisan coverage filtering; we do not assume that either network is more objective, simply that they have different partisan slants.

Even though survey experiments tend to find smaller effects among consistent partisan media viewers (de Benedictis-Kessner et al. 2019), this subject pool was the most appropriate to test our theoretical argument: to understand the impact of watching partisan media on those who watch it, one must examine effects among those who choose to watch it. Of course, however, this makes our experiment a hard test given that regular partisan media viewers are traditionally expected to be especially difficult to persuade.

Procedures

We summarize the experimental design briefly in Figure 1 and in more detail in Figure OA1. We drew inspiration for the design from elements of recent studies from Chen and Yang (2019), Allcott et al. (2020), Gross, Porter and Wood (2019), and Gerber, Karlan and Bergan (2009).

Figure 1: Overview of the Experimental Design



Sample. In order to evaluate the impact of partisan media *on those who watch it*, we must begin with a sample of people who actually watch partisan media (de Benedictis-Kessner et al. 2019). Such a sample is difficult to identify because partisans dramatically over-report their consumption of partisan media and, given that most people do not watch partisan media, it would be cost-prohibitive to recruit a meaningful sample of regular partisan media viewers from a random sample survey (Prior 2013*a*). We overcame these challenges with a unique data source. In particular, we began the experiment by first identifying current viewers of Fox News using TV viewership data from a media analytics company. Many modern "smart TVs" are internet-connected devices that, for users who opt-in, use automatic content recognition to measure what a particular TV is watching and then report this information back to the TV manufacturer. Manufacturers then sell this data to marketers. Using a TV's IP address, marketers can match this TV viewership data to other databases, such as voter files.[4]

Using this data from one particular smart TV brand, we identified 223,572 registered voters who the media company expected regularly watched Fox News and very minimal amounts of CNN or MSNBC. In particular, we selected voters aged 18 to 89 in households which, in the months of January, March, May, and June 2020, averaged watching between 500 and 14,400 minutes of Fox News and less than 30 minutes of both CNN and MSNBC per month.[5]

First Baseline Survey. We then mailed all 223,572 voters in these households a letter inviting them to participate in a paid, online survey. In this initial baseline survey, we obtained informed consent, requested an email address, asked an attention check question, and gathered demographic data. We also asked respondents to self-report their weekly TV viewership, including at which hours of the day they typically watched Fox News, and if they would be willing to participate in a study where they were paid to watch TV. $N = 15,048$ participants responded to this baseline

[4]In Online Appendix Section 12.4 we discuss how this TV viewership data is measured with error. However, as we discuss there, starting with a sample that is highly likely to watch partisan media, even if not perfectly likely, still has the advantages noted.

[5]We set the upper limit of 14,400 minutes of Fox News per month to eliminate potentially bad data.

survey.

We then narrowed the sample further to those individuals who self-reported a willingness to participate in a study where they were paid to watch TV, either self-reported at least an hour per week of Fox News or reported regularly watching one of the individual programs that aired at the same time we would later incentivize some subjects to watch CNN (Dilliplane, Goldman and Mutz 2013), and did not report watching more than 15 minutes per week of CNN.[6] This left us with $N = 5,536$ participants who we invited to a second baseline survey.

Offer Survey. This second baseline survey, or "offer survey," asked additional background demographic questions before inviting participants to participate in an experiment (see Online Appendix Section 5.1 for full wording). We asked participants: "We are interested in what people think when they watch TV channels different than the channels that they usually watch. Some people may be selected to earn more than $10 per survey in September if they agree to watch a new channel for a few hours and answer questions about what they saw." We then told participants they had been selected to watch CNN and gave them an option to select certain hours to watch CNN during the week. For reasons of practicality, we only gave participants the option of watching CNN during the Monday-Friday prime time hours.[7] We first showed participants only the hours during Monday-Friday prime time at which they had told us they watched Fox News during the previous week. If they selected under 7 hours on this screen, we showed them another screen that allowed them to select additional hours, up to 7 per week in total. Participants could select

[6]Although self-reports of media consumption are often subject to over-reporting, we took this additional step given the potential for measurement error in the viewership data, to be additionally confident that the sample captured frequent Fox News viewers. Results we report later on find that participants assigned to watch CNN were less knowledgeable about information presented on Fox News during the incentivized viewership period, consistent with the sample being largely comprised of regular Fox News viewers at baseline.

[7]The CNN line-up during these hours (the shows we drove participants *to*) was Erin Burnett OutFront, Anderson Cooper 360, Cuomo Prime Time, and the first hour of CNN Tonight with Don Lemon. The Fox News line-up during these hours (the shows we pulled participants away *from*) was The Story with Martha MacCallum, Tucker Carlson Tonight, Hannity, and The Ingraham Angle. We limited the experiment to the prime time hours because we thought treatment compliance would be higher, as participants might have more consistent schedules during the evenings than the rest of the day. Additionally, Smith and Searles (2013, Table 1) find that the prime time shows are more likely to engage in what we refer to as partisan coverage filtering compared to the daytime news shows.

no hours if they were not interested in participating. After participants selected hours, we then confirmed a final time if they would fully participate with the study. We then limited our sample for the experiment to only those participants who agreed to watch at least one hour per week of CNN rather than Fox News during the Monday-Friday prime time hours. This left 763 individuals living in 695 households in the final sample included in the experiment.

Sample Demographics and Representativeness. Online Appendix Section 8 provides more details on the demographics of the sample at each stage, illustrating both the kinds of voters ultimately included in the experiment and how the process of selecting the sample described above influenced its composition. Table OA2 and Figure OA2 reported there show that, overall, our selection process led to a sample that was largely representative of the starting sample, but even more conservative and that watched even more Fox News. As might be expected from a sample of Fox News viewers, relative to the average American, the individuals we selected for the study were, on average, older (average age of 54), whiter (95%), more Republican (92% self-identified as Republican), more active voters (90% voted in the 2016 general election), and more frequent Fox News viewers (self-reported watching an average of 840 minutes per week).[8] Figure OA3 provides the distribution of self-reported cable news viewership in the final sample.

We note that our finding that the regular Fox News viewers we recruited to our study were largely politically active partisans to begin with validates our assumption that our experiment would represent a hard test: it was conducted among a sample of voters who we would expect to be hard to persuade.

Randomization. We then block-randomized at the household level $n = 304$ individuals to a treatment group paid \$15 per hour to watch CNN or $n = 459$ individuals to a control group that received no payment to watch CNN. The treatment group subjects agreed to and we then incen-

[8]We cannot quantify how the sample in the experiment differs from Fox News viewers generally for reasons described above: other than in the present study, individual-level data on which individuals actually watch Fox News (as opposed to self-report doing so) in the general public does not exist (Prior 2013*a*).

tivized to watch an average of 5.8 hours of CNN per week (median of 7 hours). The incentivized period to watch CNN began on August 31, 2020 and ended on September 25, 2020.

Treatment Notification and Implementation. We told both treatment and control group participants that they would receive a series of short surveys over the course of September 2020 that we would pay them $10 each for completing. We refer to these as "quiz surveys." At the start of each week, we developed questions to ask both treatment and control subjects about based on media coverage for the prior week.[9] These questions probed both beliefs and attitudes about events happening in the news that week. Both treatment and control group subjects received these quiz surveys at the same time, holding constant the number and timing of surveys that treatment and control subjects were invited to take. Individuals received 5 quiz surveys at randomly assigned times during the incentivized period. Individuals did not know when the quiz surveys would happen in advance. Respondents in both conditions received $10 for completing each survey.

In order to ensure treatment compliance, we also told individuals in the treatment group that these quiz surveys would contain a "pop quiz" about what had happened on CNN when they were supposed to be watching. This pop quiz came near the beginning of the survey that both treatment and control subjects were asked to complete, and only appeared for treated subjects. Every night, a research assistant watched CNN live during all four incentivized hours, drafted three pop quiz questions per incentivized hour, and sent out these quizzes within 30 minutes of the show ending.[10] Treatment group individuals only received their bonus payment for watching CNN ($15 per hour since the last quiz survey) if they answered at least two out of three pop quiz questions on that quiz survey correctly.

Treatment group subjects also received a daily email and, if opted-in, text message reminding

[9]For example, we asked if respondents agreed with: "If Joe Biden is elected President, the protests in Americas cities will only get more violent." For a full list of items, see Table OA7.

[10]For example, we asked "On Monday's program, Anderson Cooper covered the wildfires taking place across the West Coast. Who did Cooper interview about these fires? Kate Brown, Governor of Oregon; Eric Garcetti, Mayor of Los Angeles; Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House." See Online Appendix Section 5.2 for further examples.

them to watch CNN that evening. We discuss further efforts to increase treatment compliance in Online Appendix Section 6.

Compliance. Compliance with watching CNN was very high in the treatment group. On average, treatment group respondents answered 12.4 out of 15 pop quiz questions correctly (median of 14). Similarly, using the television viewership data, we find that during the incentivized period, CNN viewership was significantly higher in the treatment group than in the control group ($p < 0.001$), although measurement error in the TV viewership data makes it difficult to precisely quantify how much CNN and Fox News consumption changed.[11]

Although the treatment was intended to switch participants away from Fox News and towards CNN during the incentivized period, it is possible that treatment group individuals recorded and separately watched Fox News later. We did not explicitly instruct treatment group subjects to refrain from watching Fox during the incentivized period. However, in Online Appendix Section 12.4, we present some evidence that during the incentivized period, Fox viewership, as measured by the viewership data, decreased in the treatment group. We see similar results in the self-reported survey data (Table OA9). Furthermore, as we discuss in the results section, our pattern of survey results suggests that participants consumed less of the prime time Fox shows as, for example, they are less aware of information reported on these shows. However, insofar as treatment group subjects were still watching Fox, this would bias our treatment effect estimates towards zero, leading us to, if anything, underestimate the true effect of shifting the slant of participants' media diets.

Midline and Endline Surveys. The incentivized period ended on Friday, September 25. Beginning on Monday, September 28, we invited respondents to participate in a midline survey to measure treatment effects. The midline survey contained a variety of items, described in more

[11] See Online Appendix Section 12.4 for additional discussion of the TV viewership results. There is clear evidence in the TV viewership data (and from the main results) that the treatment group watched significantly more CNN during the incentivized period, but, for reasons we discuss there, substantial measurement error in the viewership data means we are unable to reliably estimate the magnitude of this effect.

detail later, many of which directly corresponded with the topics and information covered on both CNN and Fox News during the incentivized period. We invited all 763 individuals randomized to treatment or control to respond to this midline survey, with 744 participating (97.5%). In Online Appendix Section 7 we discuss the approaches we used to achieve these high survey response rates. We closed this survey on October 14.

Finally, beginning on November 20, we invited individuals to participate in an endline survey. A total of 727 (95.3%) responded. We closed this survey on December 9.

Ethics

This experiment was approved by the human subjects committee at REDACTED University and determined to present minimal risks to human subjects. The authors further affirm that this article adheres to the APSA Principles and Guidance on Human Subjects Research. For instance, the experiment did not interfere with political processes; the size of the treatment group was small and we did not find, nor did we expect to find, any evidence of long-run effects on candidate choices. Finally, participants provided informed consent and were compensated for their participation.

Fox News and CNN Coverage During September 2020

We first contextualize the coverage on Fox News and CNN during the treatment period (August 31 - September 25, 2020) and the hours when treatment group subjects were incentivized to watch CNN instead of Fox News with an analysis of their coverage during this time. This analysis provides descriptive evidence for the existence of both agenda setting and partisan coverage filtering on both networks.

To conduct the transcript analysis, we first provided a research assistant with a list of broad topics (e.g., COVID-19) and, within these, subtopics, capturing specific information (e.g., long COVID exists). We based the subtopics on notes the research assistant had taken on the most

common information covered on the two networks during the incentivized period. The research assistant then read every Fox News and CNN transcript during the incentivized period. If a subtopic was discussed, the research assistant then copied any quotes directly relevant to that subtopic into a spreadsheet. This allowed us to count the number of words that Fox News and CNN each dedicated to each topic and subtopic.

CNN and Fox News covered dramatically different topic areas during this period (agenda setting)—but even within topic areas, CNN and Fox News covered different subtopics, corresponding with different information (partisan coverage filtering). Online Appendix Figure OA17 shows that CNN gave substantially more coverage to topics related to COVID and election integrity than Fox News, which disproportionately focused on issues related to race and protests. To delve into the content of this coverage (i.e., the subtopics), the top panel of Figure 2 presents the ten most common subtopics CNN discussed and how often these were discussed on Fox News. In the bottom panel, we do the same with the most common Fox News topics. In Table OA18 we present data on all of the topics and subtopics the research assistant coded.

As can be seen, CNN and Fox News covered very different topics and information during the incentivized viewership period. Consistent with partisan coverage filtering, Fox News was far more likely to report facts favorable to Republicans while CNN was far more likely to do the same for Democrats.

COVID-19's severity and the Trump administration's failures to control the virus were by far the most common topics on CNN. For example, CNN spent 21,244 words discussing "Trump's failures to protect US & his supporters from COVID-19," while Fox News spent a relatively scant 2,086 words on this topic. Likewise, CNN spent 10,251 words discussing the severity of COVID-19 (e.g., the threat posed by long COVID), while Fox News devoted only 709 words to information describing the virus' severity. By contrast, Fox News devoted a great deal of airtime to downplaying the severity of COVID-19 and the efforts Donald Trump had undertaken to protect Americans from the virus.

Figure 2: Transcript Analysis During Treatment Period

(a) Top 10 CNN Subtopics



(b) Top 10 Fox News Subtopics



Notes: Table OA18 presents numerical values for the entire set of topics coded. Figure OA17 sums up these results by topic area and shows that CNN and Fox News covered different topics as well.

On the other hand, Fox News' main focus during this time was on racial issues and related racial protests in American cities during the summer of 2020; Fox News indicated that Joe Biden and Democrats generally supported the protesters' tactics and demands. Fox News spent 15,236 words discussing this "Biden/Democrats support for extreme racial ideology/protests" topic, while CNN spent 1,300 words on this topic.

Both networks covered voting by mail, but provided different information about it. CNN described voting by mail as largely secure, and covered Russian attempts to undermine confidence in the 2020 election, especially by reducing confidence in voting by mail. Fox News barely covered these topics, instead detailing how voting by mail would be susceptible to fraud.

Across all three of these major topics, then, both networks provided a highly filtered set of information.

Experimental Results

Our primary hypotheses explore whether replacing an individual's Fox News viewership with CNN has consequences on that individual's factual beliefs, political attitudes, policy preferences, perceptions of issues' importance, and broader political views. To assess this, we turn to analyzing the survey data collected during the incentivized period (the quiz surveys), shortly thereafter (midline), and two months after the end of the incentivized period (endline).

Analytical Strategy

Our pre-registered analytical strategy follows the design in Broockman, Kalla and Sekhon (2017). We estimate the effects of the treatment incentivizing CNN viewership by comparing survey responses among those assigned to the treatment group to those assigned to the control group.[12] We

[12]This is an intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis. Given any of our potential measures of treatment compliance likely suffer from at least some measurement error, we limit ourselves to this ITT analysis and do not present any TOT analyses.

use OLS with pre-treatment covariates and standard errors clustered by household. As stated in our pre-analysis plan, we used an elastic net regression for covariate selection before running each OLS regression (see Appendix Section 10).

Our primary outcomes are indices formed by combining multiple individual survey measures into a single index in order to reduce measurement error and multiple testing. We pre-registered which survey items belonged in which index. We formed these indices by first standardizing all individual items to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 before forming an additive index of these rescaled items. In forming these indices, we recoded each item such that positive values indicate that the treatment moved subjects' views in a more liberal direction (i.e., the expected direction from watching CNN instead of Fox News).

As we pre-registered, we report three types of p-values in order to adjust for multiple comparisons. First, we report conventional, unadjusted p-values from the covariated-adjusted OLS regression. Second, we report false discovery rate sharpened q-values (Anderson 2008). This is the primary approach used in recent experimental work on media effects (e.g., Chen and Yang 2019; Allcott et al. 2020). The q-values are adjusted for false discovery rates across all the items in the entire survey; e.g., all the items in the entire midline survey are adjusted together. We separately adjust the results on the indices. Finally, we report family-wise error rate adjusted p-values for the individual items only. These are much more conservative (Westfall and Young 1993). For this adjustment we use the assignment of items to families that we determined ex-ante and were detailed in our pre-analysis plans.

Online Appendix Section 10 presents additional details on our analytical strategy. In addition, Online Appendices 8 and 9 present tests of design assumptions, in particular tests for covariate balance at each stage and tests for differential attrition. To aid interpretability, Appendix Table O19 also reports results on dichotomized versions of some of the items that showed the largest treatment effects. Finally, Online Appendix 11 presents numerical results for all of the individual items and indices on our surveys, including all the results described in the results section below.

This section also lists all of the individual items in each index.

Effects During Incentivized Period (Quiz Surveys)

We first present treatment effects on survey items measured during the incentivized period. As reviewed earlier, both treatment and control group subjects received five 'quiz' surveys during the incentivized period.[13]

In the quizzes, we asked survey questions measuring seven indices:

1. *Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index.* This measures people's beliefs about events currently in the news. All of these were true/false questions. For example, in Week 3 we asked: "Back in February, Donald Trump admitted privately that he knew the coronavirus was much more deadly than the flu." This would be coded as 1 if the respondent thought this was true and 0 if they thought it was false.

2. *Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index.* This measures people's attitudes towards events currently in the news. These were all agree/disagree questions. For example, in Week 3 we asked: "Given what he knew about the coronavirus back in February, President Trump probably should have more strongly warned Americans about the coronavirus."

3. *General Media Attitudes Index.* This measures whether exposure to CNN in the treatment group caused individuals to be more trusting of the media in general.

4. *Increased CNN Trust.* This measures trust towards CNN.

5. *Reduced Fox Trust.* This measures reduced trust towards Fox News.

6. *Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index.* This asks whether people had seen negative or positive news about each of Joe Biden and Donald Trump in the last day. Higher values

[13] We made clear to treated respondents that their responses to these questions were *not* incentivized. The items enforcing compliance do not constitute outcomes; we only asked them to the treatment group.

capture more pro-Biden and anti-Trump news.

7. *Short-Term Emotion Index.* This measures whether the treatment changes individuals' emotional states (happiness and anxiety).

Figure 3 presents results on each of these seven indices by survey timing. We asked two surveys in the first week of the incentivized period and one survey in weeks two, three, and four. Full numerical and item-specific results are presented in Table OA7.

Figure 3: Treatment Effect on Quiz Survey Items



Notes: Standard errors (thick lines) and 95% confidence intervals (thin) surround point estimates. See Table OA7 for numerical estimates.

First, we find that the treatment shifted the partisan valence of news that individuals viewed. Treatment group individuals were far more likely to recall seeing negative news about Donald

Trump and positive news about Joe Biden and far less likely to recall seeing positive news about Donald Trump and negative news about Joe Biden than the control group. Across the five weeks, treatment effects ranged from 0.11 - 0.23 standard deviations on the indices.

Second, and consistent with partisan coverage filtering, we find that the treatment changed individuals' beliefs, causing them to learn about events unfavorable to Republicans and favorable to Democrats than the control group (current events perceptions). For example, treated individuals were more likely to know that Donald Trump did not meet with the family of Jacob Blake, a Kenosha, Wisconsin man who was shot by police (Quiz 3; $p_{unadj.} < 0.01; q < 0.01; p_{wy} = 0.76$), and more likely to know that Donald Trump admitted privately in February 2020 that he knew COVID-19 was more dangerous than the flu (Quiz 4; $p_{unadj.} < 0.01; q = 0.06; p_{wy} = 0.97$). In the first four surveys, treatment effects ranged from 0.07-0.21 standard deviations on the indices and were statistically significant using either conventional or adjusted p-values (ps$_{unadj.} < 0.02; q$s < 0.05). In the final quiz survey, while treatment effects failed to reach conventional levels of significance, they nonetheless were of similar magnitude as the prior week. Online Appendix Figure OA20 shows treatment effects on each individual item within the indices.

We also found effects on attitudes towards events during the incentivized period, with statistically significant effects on this index in four of the five quizzes. For example, participants were less likely to agree that "It is an overreaction to go out and protest in response to the police shooting of Jacob Blake in Kenosha, Wisconsin" (Quiz 2 $p < 0.01; q < 0.01; p_{wy} = 0.40$), and less likely to believe that "If Joe Biden is elected President, we'll see many police get shot by Black Lives Matter activists" (Quiz 5 $p < 0.01; q < 0.01; p_{wy} = 0.27$). (See Online Appendix Figure OA21 for results on all individual items.)

However, on the indices measuring general media attitudes, CNN trust, Fox News trust, and short-term emotions, we found no meaningful and consistent treatment effects.

Midline Results

We next present treatment effects on survey items measured during the midline survey, launched three days after the end of the incentivized period. In the midline survey, we asked survey questions organized into 24 distinct indices. Table OA8 gives examples of items contained within each index. Figure 4 presents the treatment effect on each index. In the sections that follow below, we limit our discussion to only the most pertinent indices. Online Appendix 11.2 presents the numerical results on all indices and individual items, and includes figures with the by-item results for indices not presented in the main text. To aid interpretability, Appendix Table O19 reports results on dichotomized versions of some of the items that showed the largest treatment effects.

Testing for Agenda Setting

A classical finding from the literature on media effects is that the volume of media coverage changes which problems people bring to mind more readily and the importance voters place on those problems.

We see evidence consistent with this agenda setting hypothesis on the "CNN (vs. Fox)-Consistent Issue Important" index. We find that the treatment group is far less likely to rate issues as important that Fox News heavily emphasized than the control group (as demonstrated in Figure 2). Across the entire index, the treatment group was 0.11 standard deviations more likely to believe that issues that CNN talked more about were more important than the control group ($p_{unadj.} < 0.01; q = 0.01$).

We present results by individual items in Figure OA4. For example, CNN was far more likely to cover the severity of COVID-19 while Fox News was far more likely to cover the negative consequences of racial protests. Consistent with this, the treatment group was 0.3 standard deviations less likely than the control group to believe that it is more important for the President to focus on violent protests than the coronavirus pandemic ($p_{unadj.} < 0.01; q < 0.05; p_{wy} = 0.17$).

Figure 4: Treatment Effect on Indices in the Midline Survey



Notes: Standard errors (thick lines) and 95% confidence intervals (thin) surround point estimates. See Table OA9 for numerical estimates. q is the FDR sharpened q-value (Anderson 2008). We do not calculate p_{wy} for indices.

Testing for Partisan Coverage Filtering: Effects on Knowledge and Beliefs

We also see evidence for the effects of partisan coverage filtering: individuals in the treatment group learned different information as a result of watching CNN rather than Fox News. We see this across several indices.

First, individuals in the treatment group know more information flattering to the liberal side of a story on events that CNN predominately covered and know less information flattering to the conservative side of a story on events that Fox News predominately covered. For example, the treatment group was 0.20 standard deviations less likely to believe that Donald Trump's campaign was taking significant safety precautions at its rallies to reduce the risk that rally attendees spread the coronavirus to each other ($p_{unadj.} < 0.01; q < 0.05; p_{wy} = 0.52$); CNN heavily covered the fact that Trump's campaign did not do so. Similarly, the treatment group was 0.24 standard deviations less likely to agree that Democrats were trying to steal the 2020 election with fraudulent mail-in ballots, something Fox News heavily covered as true ($p_{unadj.} < 0.01; q < 0.05; p_{wy} = 0.19$). We present treatment effects across the full set of survey items in these two indices in Figures 5 and OA5.

We also find that individuals in the treatment group have significantly different understandings of COVID-19 compared to the control group, consistent with a recent literature finding impacts of partisan media viewership on COVID-19-related behaviors (e.g., Ash et al. 2022). For example, we find that individuals in the treatment group are 0.18 standard deviations more likely to know about long-COVID ($p_{unadj.} < 0.01; q < 0.05; p_{wy} = 0.14$) and 0.16 standard deviations more likely to recognize that many other countries have done a better job controlling the pandemic compared to the United States ($p_{unadj.} < 0.01; q = 0.08; p_{wy} = 0.27$). See Figure OA6 for results across the full COVID-19 index.

Changing participants' media diets also imparted new information to them about the candidates for office. The treatment group is 0.08 standard deviations more likely to be knowledgeable about Trump's political positions that CNN covered ($p_{unadj.} < 0.01; q = 0.01$) and

Figure 5: Treatment Effect Tasting Partisan Coverage Filtering: Liberal Perception of Events Fox Covered



Notes: Standard errors (thick lines) and 95% confidence intervals (thin) surround point estimates. See Table OA9 for numerical estimates. q is the FDR sharpened q-value (Anderson 2008) and p_{wy} is the FWER adjusted p-value (Westfall and Young 1993).

0.08 standard deviations less likely to harbor misperceptions about Biden's Fox-covered political positions ($p_{unadj.} = 0.02; q = 0.06$). For example, the treatment group is 0.17 standard deviations less likely to believe that Biden supports eliminating all funding for the police ($p_{unadj.} < 0.01; q = 0.08; p_{wy} = 0.70$).[14]

[14]We do not see statistically significant treatment effects on Fox-covered Trump positions or CNN-covered Biden positions. This null finding is unsurprising given that Fox rarely covered Trump's issue positions and CNN rarely covered Biden's issue positions; the networks largely covered the *other* side's candidate (see Table OA18).

At the same time, as can be seen, there were not effects on every item we asked. A non-pre-registered analysis suggests this is because some of the items tapped information that did not receive as much coverage and so participants heard less about. In particular, Online Appendix Figure OA18 also shows that there is a suggestive item-level correlation between which information was covered more often on CNN and Fox News during the incentivized period and the causal effects on those items. Many of the items on which we find null effects are items capturing topics that our transcript analysis finds did not receive much coverage on CNN and Fox News during the incentivized period; effects on items that did receive extensive coverage are more reliably present.

Effects on Political Attitudes and Evaluations

The above results show that partisan media engage in agenda setting and partisan coverage filtering, with effects on its viewers' beliefs and their perceptions of issues' importance. We next show that these and other mechanisms for media effects (e.g., framing) together have meaningful effects on viewers' political evaluations and preferences.

First, the treatment caused individuals to become substantially more supportive of vote-by-mail (VBM) than the control group. This was one of the most frequently covered topics on both networks (see Figure 2) and one that received radically different coverage across the two networks: CNN was 13 times more likely to cover how VBM is secure and 3 times more likely to provide descriptions and education on VBM than Fox News while Fox News was twice as likely to cover how VBM is susceptible to fraud (see Table OA13). This coverage caused individuals to shift their preferences around VBM. The treatment group was 0.24 standard deviations more likely to agree that states should allow voters to vote by mail in the 2020 election ($p_{unadj.} < 0.01; q = 0.01; p_{wy} = 0.06$) and 0.18 standard deviations less likely to agree that VBM will lead to widespread fraud ($p_{unadj.} < 0.01; q = 0.02; p_{wy} = 0.15$). However, not all issue attitudes shifted. As we show in Figures OA9-11, attitudes around race, climate change, and policing remain unchanged.

Second, the treatment caused individuals to become more negative in their evaluations towards

Donald Trump and Republican politicians. Figure 6 shows effects across all the items on the index. On the index, we find the treatment caused a 0.10 standard deviation reduction in evaluations of Trump ($p_{unadj.} < 0.01; q = 0.01$). For example, Trump's feeling thermometer rating decreases from an average of 84.5 in the control group to 81.6 in the treatment group, a statistically significant decrease ($p_{unadj.} < 0.01; q = 0.02; p_{wy} = 0.06$).

Figure 6: Treatment Effect on Evaluations of Donald Trump



Notes: Standard errors (thick lines) and 95% confidence intervals (thin) surround point estimates. See Table OA9 for numerical estimates. q is the FDR sharpened q-value (Anderson 2008) and p_{wy} is the FWER adjusted p-value (Westfall and Young 1993).

However, we see no significant increase in evaluations towards Biden (see Figure OA13) or shifts in partisan identification (see Figure OA12).

Effects on Attitudes towards Fox News and CNN

Finally, Figure 7 shows that we find that the treatment caused a 0.09 standard deviation increase in unfavorable attitudes towards Fox News ($p_{unadj.} = 0.02; q = 0.05$). Most notably, we find a 0.20 standard deviation effect on disagreement with the statement "If Donald Trump did something bad, Fox News would discuss it" ($p_{unadj.} < 0.01; q = 0.02; p_{wy} = 0.15$). Watching CNN instead of Fox thus led participants to conclude that Fox engages in partisan coverage filtering.

Figure 7: Treatment Effect on Favorability Towards Fox News



Notes: Standard errors (thick lines) and 95% confidence intervals (thin) surround point estimates. See Table OA9 for numerical estimates. q is the FDR sharpened q-value (Anderson 2008) and p_{wy} is the FWER adjusted p-value (Westfall and Young 1993).

However, as shown in Figure OA14, we find no significant increase in favorability towards CNN.

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Online Appendix Section 11.5 presents several tests for heterogeneous treatment effects across two indices intended to capture some of our major findings: the Trump evaluation index and the Attitudes Towards Fox-Covered Events index. There we first present analyses of heterogeneity

by two pre-registered moderators: an index of baseline items capturing respondents' strength of Republican identification/support and an index of baseline Fox viewership frequency. We expected both might moderate resistance to attitude change from a shift in media diets (e.g., Prior 2013*b*; Zaller 1992). Overall, there is some evidence of greater resistance in the directions prior literature would expect, but by and large the effects we found manifested fairly broadly across the sample.

Evidence on Mechanisms for Effects on Political Attitudes and Evaluations

The mechanism for the effects we found on beliefs seems very likely to be information (e.g., information that long-COVID exists on CNN is probably what led treated participants to be aware that long-COVID exists).

However, what mechanism or combination of mechanisms led subjects to change their political attitudes and evaluations? Online Appendix Section 11.5.2 presents a non-pre-registered analysis consistent with partisan coverage filtering representing a likely mechanism for the effects on attitudes and political evaluations we found. In particular, we evaluate the leading alternative explanation the literature would suggest: priming due to agenda-setting—i.e., that participants simply hearing more about topics on which they have liberal opinions at baseline caused their overall attitudes to become more liberal, as these pre-existing liberal attitudes were primed by CNN's agenda-setting efforts. The classic test for such media priming is to examine how effects of consuming media vary by the baseline attitude being primed. In our data, we therefore test how several effects we found on political attitudes and evaluations differ by baseline attitudes about topics that were extensively covered on Fox and CNN during the intervention.

Given the findings in Figure OA17 that CNN largely focused on COVID and Fox News largely focused on issues of protests and race during the treatment, we would expect moving participants from consuming Fox News to CNN to prime attitudes related to COVID and reduce the salience of attitudes related to protests and race when evaluating Trump. Accordingly, Appendix Table OA16 tests for whether the treatment had the effects that it did on political attitudes and evaluations by

simply priming pre-existing negative evaluations of Trump's handling of COVID-19 respondents already harbored at baseline. We find no evidence that such a priming effect is solely responsible for the results; the vast majority of the sample approved of Trump's handling of COVID-19 at baseline and the effects remain statistically significant among this group. Second, Appendix Table OA17 conducts a similar test with a baseline measure of support for the summer 2020 protests and finds similar results. These results should not be particularly surprising given the conservative lean of our sample; few respondents had liberal attitudes to begin with, making it unlikely that the effects we found on political attitudes and evaluations would have resulted from liberal attitudes being primed. These results suggest partisan coverage filtering is likely to contribute to the effects we found on political attitudes and evaluations.

Endline Results

Finally, two months after the end of the incentivized period, we launched the endline survey. The endline survey asked most of the same items as on the midline survey; we did not change the items to reflect events that had occured in the months between when the incentivized period ended and the endline survey launched.

First, did participants choose to keep watching CNN, or to watch less Fox News, after we stopped incentivizing them to do so? In the endline survey, we asked respondents how many hours of CNN they watched yesterday and how much CNN they watched over the course of the past week. As shown in Table OA10, we estimate that that the treatment group reported watching 5 additional minutes of CNN yesterday on average ($p_{unadj.} < 0.01; q < 0.05; p_{wy} = 0.09$) and 15 additional minutes over the course of the past week ($p_{unadj.} = 0.02; q = 0.12; p_{wy} = 0.20$). However, as shown in Tables OA11-12, when using the television viewership data rather than the self-reported survey data, we find no statistically significant increases in CNN viewership during this period. This could be caused by measurement error and under-counting in the television viewership data (see Online Appendix 11.4 for discussion); the effects on long-run CNN viewership are therefore

somewhat ambiguous. We also see little sign of long-run changes in Fox News viewership. Overall, then, there is some evidence that some participants kept watching CNN after the treatment ended, but we do not find evidence of large long-run changes.

Figure 8 presents results on the attitudes and beliefs measured in the endline survey (launched two months after the incentivized period ended). In general, we find that many of the effects from the midline survey dissipated although some appear to have persisted. For example, the long-run effects on views towards events Fox covered during the incentivized period, evaluations of Biden, and knowledge of CNN-covered Trump positions were all near or at statistical significance at conventional levels. However, these findings do not survive a multiple comparison adjustment. For the null findings, the confidence intervals are large and many overlap with the effect estimates in the midline survey. Future work with a larger sample size is necessary to fully assess the extent of decay.

We discuss our interpretation of these results in the discussion section.

Discussion

Partisan media sources have been found to meaningfully affect vote choices and election results (e.g., DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Martin and Yurukoglu 2017). However, we know very little about what changes in beliefs or attitudes might underlie these changes in political behavior, leaving the effects of partisan media—and its broader implications for democracy—both "well-known but poorly understood" (Yglesias 2018).

We argued that partisan media influences viewers through agenda setting, framing and, in addition, an underappreciated process we call partisan coverage filtering, or selectively reporting information flattering to its ideological side. We presented a unique field experiment which recruited frequent Fox News viewers and incentivized them to watch CNN instead for four weeks. A content analysis found that the two networks provided dramatically different information during

Figure 8: Treatment Effect on Indices in the Endline Survey



Notes: Standard errors (thick lines) and 95% confidence intervals (thin) surround point estimates. See Table OA10 for numerical estimates. q is the FDR sharpened q-value (Anderson 2008) and p_{wy} is the FWER adjusted p-value (Westfall and Young 1993).

this period. Consistent with partisan coverage filtering having impacts, our experiment then found that watching CNN instead of Fox News had significant impacts on viewers' beliefs, attitudes, and evaluations. In other words, partisan media does not simply remind people of certain beliefs they already hold (priming), it leads viewers to learn about a biased set of facts, which appears to have consequences for their attitudes. We also found that participants in the treatment group underestimated Fox News' degree of bias, as they were more likely to agree that if Donald Trump did something bad, Fox News would not cover it.

That incentivizing regular Fox News viewers to instead watch CNN would have effects on their political beliefs and attitudes was by no means obvious. Consistent with theories of selective exposure, we found that the regular Fox News viewers we recruited to our sample were nearly all strong Republicans and highly politically engaged. Much prior literature would lead us to expect these individuals to be most likely to reject information contrary to their prior viewpoints, or from sources like CNN they do not trust (for review, see Prior 2013*b*; Zaller 1992). Furthermore, Republican elites, notably Donald Trump, regularly criticized CNN, signaling that it was not a trustworthy source. Viewed from the vantage point of many influential theories, it is surprising that the experiment found the effects it did.

Demand effects were unlikely to explain our findings: we found a number of effects decayed, and we found null effects on many items, especially those which did not receive substantial coverage on Fox or CNN. With respect to our central results supporting partisan coverage filtering, it also seems unlikely that demand would have led participants to feign ignorance of information reported on Fox News, and is unclear how it would have led them to feign knowledge of the information reported on CNN other than by watching CNN and learning this information.

Several limitations of our findings are worthy of emphasis. First, our experiment may have led individuals to pay unusually close attention to CNN, since they knew there would be quizzes on its content. Helping assuage this concern, however, we found large effects on items that were only covered on Fox, showing that substitution away from Fox, and not only incentivized coverage of

CNN, has effects. Second, we measure only the direct effects of the shift in media diets on the individuals in our study and did not measure the potential "two-step flow" to others they came in contact with (Druckman, Levendusky and McLain 2018). At the same time, counter-arguing from others in the household could have attenuated the effects we found. Third, since our intervention held constant the presence of partisan media, and simply shifted its slant (from Fox News to CNN), our estimates do not capture any effects of simply watching media. Fourth, as with any experiment, we cannot definitively determine the mechanisms behind our findings. With that said, our results on beliefs are very likely to be driven by the information relevant to those beliefs, and we presented evidence suggesting that priming was unlikely to be chiefly responsible for our findings. Fifth, although we found that the sample in the experiment was fairly representative of the starting sample (see Online Appendix Table OA2 and Figure OA2), the effects we observe may not be generalizable beyond the sample of participants willing to be paid to watch a different news network. Sixth, our experiment was not well-positioned to measure broader impacts of partisan media, such as for outcomes including what other media sources cover, donation behavior, or elite behavior, themes investigated in other research (e.g., Clinton and Enamorado 2014). Finally, we only considered the effect of shifting Fox News viewers to CNN. While our theoretical argument would expect similar effects among viewers of other partisan media networks, future work should attempt to replicate this (e.g., shift MSNBC viewers to Fox News).

Our findings suggest that partisan media's role in spreading misinformation (Nyhan 2020) without making explicitly false claims should be a focus of future research. For example, even though Fox News never explicitly stated that Biden supported cutting police funding, it strongly implied this, and respondents who were assigned to continue watching Fox were more likely to believe this.

Our findings suggest a number of broader implications. First, our findings that participants' attitudes shifted at first away from and then back towards their partisan side along with changes in their viewership behavior accord with Ladd and Lenz's (2009) conclusion that "stable elite

communication flows" in the media, "rather than any inherent durability of public preferences," may explain why public opinion is typically so resistant to change (p. 405). In other words, media may be important in part because it continually 'replenishes' people's partisan loyalties and political beliefs, giving it tremendous ongoing power even if its immediate effects are short-term.

Second, our results indicate challenges that partisan media may pose for democratic accountability. Media outlets plays a central role in helping voters hold elected officials accountable (e.g., Garz and Martin 2021; Hopkins and Pettingill 2018; Snyder and Strömberg 2010). By the same token, hiding information from voters can undermine their ability to hold their elected officials accountable (Besley and Prat 2006). Our evidence indicates that partisan media do exactly this, with manifold consequences for their beliefs and attitudes. Viewed from this vantage point, partisan media is not simply a challenge for the opposing party—it may present a challenge for democracy.

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Online Appendix

Contents

1 Pre-Registration

This experiment was pre-registered at https://osf.io/9fdq2/?view_only=23d11559495b48269e18523e4870ac4f for the midline and https://osf.io/chsf2/?view_only=4ca51b40718944dbaa35825e8b38cb62 for the endline.

2 CONSORT-Style Diagram

The below figure provides an overview of the experimental design.

Figure OA1: CONSORT-Style Diagram



3 Possible Alternative Experimental Designs

In the below table, we present several possible experimental designs that we considered. We wanted to design an experiment that would allow us to test both the implications of partisan coverage filtering (do different networks cover different events, leading viewers to have different understandings of the world?) and the limits of selective exposure (are current partisan media viewers incapable of being persuaded?). Based on our budget and power calculations, we were only able to have one treatment condition.

Table OA1 shows the possible designs we could have used. We carefully considered which of these designs would be best given the criteria laid out in the previous paragraph.

In order to test the implications of partisan coverage filtering, we thought the ideal experiment would compare Fox News to CNN. This holds constant exposure to news while varying the source of the news. This therefore eliminates the rows with "Neither." Similarly, in order to test the limits of selective exposure, we needed to have a sample of current partisan media viewers.

This limited us to two designs: incentivize Fox News viewers to watch CNN or incentivize CNN viewers to watch Fox News. Given we conducted this experiment while Donald Trump was president, we thought we would better be able to test whether congenial partisan media undermines accountability by selectively informing viewers of incumbent actions by taking viewers of the more pro-Trump Fox News and exposing them to the more anti-Trump CNN.

In the context of September 2020 when the experiment was run, this was therefore the best design for testing both partisan coverage filtering and probing the limits of selective exposure.

Currently Watch	Incentivized to Watch	Tests Partisan Coverage Filtering?	Tests Limits of Selective Exposure?
Neither	FNC	Ambiguous	No
Neither	CNN	Ambiguous	No
FNC	Neither	No	Yes, but not ideal
FNC	CNN	Yes	Yes
CNN	Neither	No	Yes, but not ideal
CNN	FNC	Yes, but not ideal for testing incumbent accountability	Yes

Table OA1: Possible Experimental Designs

4 Additional Suvey Details

The complete survey instruments are available in the `Surveys` folder of the OSF project (linked to in the PAPs above).

4.1 Screenshots of Asking about Participation in Study

The below screenshots come from our second baseline survey. These questions were used to determine who was eligible for the experiment and at what hours they could be incentivized to watch CNN.

Q44. You should have received a $5 gift card or donation for Amazon after completing the last survey. You will also receive another $10 for after completing this survey. (You selected An **Amazon.com gift card** for $10.)

We will be inviting you to take more surveys in the weeks ahead.

Every week in September we plan to email you 1-2 short surveys. We will pay you $10 per survey for completing each survey.

Q39. We are interested in what people think when they watch TV channels different than the channels that they usually watch.

Some people may be selected to earn more than $10 per survey in September if they agree to watch a new channel for a few hours and answer questions about what they saw.

Based on what you have told us, we have selected a channel you said you do not watch often. On the next page we will ask you if you would be willing to watch this channel for a few hours during September and be paid $15 per hour you watch it.

Q38. We may select you to be paid to watch **CNN** during September. If you are selected, **we will pay you $15 per hour of CNN you watch**. You will be able to receive these payments with gift cards, just like for this survey. (Before we pay you, we will e-mail you a few easy questions about what was on CNN during that hour to check that you watched.)

At what times would you be willing to watch CNN every week during the month of September? Please select the times when you would be willing to watch CNN every week during September below. All times listed are in Central Time.

If you are not interested in participating, do not select any of the hours. Please select no more than 7.

Q43. Would you like to select any additional hours to watch CNN every week in September?

	Mondays	Tuesdays	Wednesdays	Thursdays	Fridays
4 pm - 5 pm	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5 pm - 6 pm	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6 pm - 7 pm	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7 pm - 8 pm	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8 pm - 9 pm	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
9 pm - 10 pm	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
10 pm - 11 pm	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
11 pm - 12 am	☑	☑	☑	☑	☑

Q46. **You selected 5 total hours above, so would be paid $75 in total each week of September if you are selected and watch all 5 of these hours.**

Q48. Earlier you told us you would be willing to watch 7 hours of CNN per week during September. If you continue beyond this point, it's **extremely important** that you finish the whole study. Anyone who drops out after this page can really damage the entire study.

Remember, completing the study means:

- You will answer at least 1 short survey per week in September and will be paid $10 per survey.
- If you are selected, you will do your best to watch 7 hours per week of CNN in September. You will then be paid an additional $15 per hour you watch every week.

At the start of each week, we will let you know if you are selected to watch CNN that week.

Do you commit to finishing the whole study?

- (●) Yes.
- ( ) I'm not so sure. It's probably best for me to drop out (you will still be paid for completing this survey).

4.2 Sample Quiz Questions

The below is an example of the quiz questions used on 14 September for those assigned to watch Anderson Cooper. Participants were invited to take this survey via email.

Anderson Quiz - 3 questions

Q29

We are now going to ask you three questions about what was on ${e://Field/show_at_full} on ${e://Field/dow_as_str1} at ${e://Field/start_hour}.

In order to get paid your $${e://Field/quiz_pay} bonus for watching the last ${e://Field/segments_quiz_pays_for} hours of CNN you agreed to watch, you must answer at least two questions correctly.

Q21

On Monday's program, Anderson Cooper covered recent statements made by a spokesman for the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), who accused two colleagues of "sedition." Who did Cooper interview about these accusations?

- Two former CDC officials
- Two journalists for The New York Times
- Two people who were infected with COVID-19

Q23

On Monday's program, Anderson Cooper covered the wildfires taking place across the West Coast. Who did Cooper interview about these fires?

- Kate Brown, Governor of Oregon
- Eric Garcetti, Mayor of Los Angeles
- Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House

Q25

True or False: Following the interview mentioned above, Anderson Cooper covered the shooting of two sheriff's deputies in Compton, California.

- True
- False

5 Efforts to Increase Treatment Compliance

5.1 Notifications Sent to Participants at the Start of the Experiment on Whether a Subject is in Treatment or Control

The below email was sent to subjects randomly assigned to the control group at the start of the incentivized period.

Dear [redacted],

Thank you for participating in the [redacted] Media Survey.

You have been selected to participate in more surveys over the next four weeks.

This email contains important information about how we will pay you for completing these surveys. Please read it carefully.

1. We will send you 1-2 surveys per week. **We will pay you $10 for taking each survey.** These surveys are short and should take around 5 minutes to complete.

2. When we send you the survey is random. The computer decides when you will receive your next survey.

3. Please check your email daily so that you don't miss a survey.

The surveys will be emailed to you with the subject line: "[redacted] Media Survey".

Thank you again for your participation. Please email me if you have any questions.

Sincerely,
[redacted]

The below email was sent to subjects randomly assigned to the treatment group at the start of the incentivized period.

Dear [redacted],

Thank you for participating in the [redacted] Media Survey. As you know, we are studying what people think when they watch TV channels different than the channels they usually watch.

You have been selected to be paid to watch CNN for the next four weeks, starting this Monday (August 31), and to be paid $420. Every week for the next month, you should be sure to watch **CNN** at the hours you agreed to watch:

- Mondays: 8-9pm Eastern time. This is Anderson Cooper 360.
- Mondays: 9-10pm Eastern time. This is Cuomo Prime Time.
- Tuesdays: 8-9pm Eastern time. This is Anderson Cooper 360.
- Tuesdays: 9-10pm Eastern time. This is Cuomo Prime Time.
- Wednesdays: 9-10pm Eastern time. This is Cuomo Prime Time.
- Thursdays: 9-10pm Eastern time. This is Cuomo Prime Time.
- Fridays: 9-10pm Eastern time. This is Cuomo Prime Time.

This email contains important information about how we will pay you for watching these hours. Please read it carefully.

1. Because we know your time is valuable, we will pay you $15 for every hour that you watch. **If you watch all of the above hours for the next four weeks, we will pay you a total of $420.**

2. To make sure that you are watching, we will send you a "pop quiz" survey asking about what happened on CNN when you were watching. **You will only be paid if you answer the "pop quiz" questions correctly, so please make sure to watch.**

3. Please take these "pop quiz" surveys even if you were not able to watch, since we will also have a few other questions for you. **We will also pay you $10 just for taking each survey.** These surveys are short and should take around 5 minutes to complete.

4. We will not send you a "pop quiz" survey after every hour you agreed to watch. Instead, **we will send you 1-2 "pop quiz" surveys per week. Each "pop quiz" survey will ask about one randomly selected hour that you agreed to watch.** The computer will pick these hours randomly. Make sure you watch all the hours above every week so that you can answer any "pop quiz" surveys correctly. (Each survey will pay you for all the hours you agreed to watch since the last survey. For example, if you have watched 3 hours since the last survey, you would be paid $45 if you answered the "pop quiz" correctly, even though every "pop quiz" will only ask you about what was on CNN during 1 hour.)

5. Please check your email daily so that you don't miss a survey.

6. We understand if you need to skip some hours, but we cannot pay you for hours you do not watch. Please also try to watch live rather than a recording or DVR.

The "pop quiz" surveys will be emailed to you with the subject line: "[redacted] Media Survey".

Thank you again for your participation. Please email me if you have any questions.

Sincerely,
[redacted]

We also sent treatment group subjects who opted-in to receive text messages the following text message.



5.2 Daily Reminders Sent to Treatment Group

Every day when a participant was supposed to watch CNN, they would receive an email and, if opted-in, a text message reminder. Samples of these are below.

Dear [redacted]:

We are writing to remind you that you signed up to watch CNN tonight (Thursday night).

Please watch CNN tonight from 7-8pm and 9-10pm Eastern time, during OutFront with Erin Burnett and Cuomo Prime Time.

If one of these hours is selected for a random "pop quiz", you will receive an email with the subject line "[redacted] Media Survey" containing the quiz and other questions. If you get the quiz questions right, we will pay you for that and the previous hours of CNN you agreed to watch.

[redacted]

P.S. To stop receiving these email reminders, you can click unsubscribe below.



5.3 Reminder Phone Calls to Treatment Group

In the first week, every participant was invited to take two quiz surveys. Participants needed to complete these quiz surveys in order to receive their payment for watching CNN. If a treatment group participant did not take both surveys, then a research assistant attempted to call them. Below is a copy of the script used.

Reach a Person

Hi, is this NAME?

Hi, my name is [REDACTED] and I am research assistant for [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]. I am calling about your participation in the [REDACTED] Media Survey. [pause - they might say something here]

I wanted to make sure you received Professor [REDACTED]'s latest survey invitation email. This email had a quiz where if you get it right we will pay you for watching CNN. We want to be sure you get paid so I wanted to follow up and make sure you received it.

Some things to say:

- Can I confirm your email address is EMAIL? [IF WRONG, CORRECT IN SPREADSHEET]
- Have you had any issues receiving your gift card? [IF YES, MARK IN SPREADSHEET AND PROF WILL RESEND]
- Will you be sure to participate this week? [END BY GETTING A VERBAL COMMITMENT]

Voicemail

Hi, my name is [REDACTED] and I am research assistant for [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]. I am calling about your participation in the [REDACTED] Media Survey. I noticed we sent you a quiz survey last week to pay you for watching CNN and didn't get a response. I want to be sure you get paid for watching the hours you signed up for, so please be on the look-out for emails from the [REDACTED] Media Survey. Feel free to email Professor [REDACTED] if you have any questions.

6 Efforts to Reduce Survey Attrition

6.1 Email Invitation

Participants were first invited to the midline and endline surveys via email. Below is a sample of the midline invite email.

Dear [redacted],

Thank you for being a member of the [redacted] Media Survey.

A new survey is now available! If you complete this survey, I will send you a $10 gift card or give you the opportunity to donate your $10 to charity.

This new survey will take you around 20 minutes to complete, so please be sure to start it only when you have enough time.

Follow this link to the Survey:
${l://SurveyLink?d=Take the Survey Here}

Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser:
${l://SurveyURL}

Thank you for being part of the next survey. Your response to this survey is important to me, and I truly appreciate your time. Completing this follow-up survey is voluntary.

Sincerely,
[redacted]

P.S. If you are missing a gift card from a previous survey, please reply to this email so that I can resend it to you.

${l://OptOutLink?d=%20}

6.2 Phone Call

If they did not participate in the survey after receiving the email and several follow-ups, a research assistant attempted to call them. Below is the script the research assistant used.

As context, we are done paying people to watch CNN. Now, we are asking everyone to take a follow-up survey.

The people we invited to this survey include both those randomized to be paid to watch CNN and those randomized to a control group who were not paid to watch CNN. People in the control group don't even know there were others who were paid to watch CNN, so please don't bring this up. We are intentionally not telling you who was paid to watch and who was not paid. We want to make sure you treat everyone the same in how you call them.

The people in this spreadsheet have not yet taken this survey. We want to get as many people as possible to take the survey. We have already emailed them on September 28, September 30, and October 2. Over 92% have taken the survey, so it is quite popular. These are the remaining people.

Reach a Person

Hi, is this NAME?

Hi, my name is [REDACTED] and I am research assistant for [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]. I am calling about your participation in the [REDACTED]Media Survey. [pause - they might say something here]

I wanted to make sure you received Professor [REDACTED]'s message inviting you to participate in a new survey. Professor [REDACTED] has tried emailing you a few times and has noticed that you have not taken the survey yet.

I just wanted to call to make sure you received the survey and to see if you will be participating in it. We will send you a $10 gift card if you complete the survey.

Some things to say:

- Can I confirm your email address is EMAIL? [IF WRONG, CORRECT IN SPREADSHEET COLUMN F]
- Have you had any issues receiving your previous gift cards? [IF YES, MARK IN SPREADSHEET COLUMN G AND PROF WILL RESEND]
- Will you be sure to take the survey this week? [END BY GETTING A VERBAL COMMITMENT]
- The subject line of the email with the survey is "Please take the [REDACTED] Media Survey". You can search for that in your email. [IF THEY SAY THEY DIDN'T GET THE SURVEY EMAIL]

FAQ - questions people might ask

- When do I need to take the survey by?
    - A: We will be mailing reminders to everyone who has not taken the survey on Tuesday, so if you're able to do so in the next couple days, we would really appreciate it!
- How much do I get paid for this survey?
    - A: $10
- How long does the survey take?

    - A: Around 15-20 minutes.
- Will I get paid to watch CNN? [a control group person might ask this because we mentioned in an early survey this could happen]
    - A: We will let you know if you are selected.
- I didn't have time to watch CNN, sorry, I can't participate. [a treatment group person might say this]
    - A: We completely understand if things were too busy to watch CNN. However, even if you didn't watch CNN, you are still eligible for this survey, we'll still pay you for completing it, and we would still like to have your response.

Voicemail

Hi, my name is [REDACTED] and I am research assistant for [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]. I am calling about your participation in the [REDACTED] Media Survey. I noticed that you have not participated in a survey we recently emailed you. I just wanted to call to make sure you received that survey and to see if you will be able to complete it soon. Feel free to email Professor [REDACTED] if you have any questions. Thanks!

Follow-Up Voicemail

Hi, this is [REDACTED] from the [REDACTED] Media Survey. I'm calling to follow up on a message I left Friday afternoon. We noticed that you have yet to fill out a survey that we recently sent, and wanted to make sure that you received the survey and will be able to complete it sometime soon. If you have any questions, please feel free to email Professor [REDACTED] (EMAIL) or call me back at this number. Thank you and have a great day.

6.3 Letter

Finally, on the midline survey only, if subjects still did not participate after receiving the phone call, we then followed-up by mailing a physical letter. Below is the letter we sent.

Dear [redacted],

Thank you for being a member of the [redacted] Media Survey. Last week, I emailed you to invite you to participate in a new survey. As of October 6, over 96% of participants in the [redacted] Media Study have responded. We are hoping to hear from 100% of participants, but we have not yet received your response.

Your participation in this new survey is very important to me, so I wanted to personally write you.

In addition, because your response is important to me, **if you complete this survey I will send you a $30 gift card** or give you the opportunity to donate your $30 to charity.

You can access the survey at: https://tinyurl.com/[redacted]

Your participation in this survey is voluntary, and I understand that now is a busy time. But, the survey should only take you 15-20 minutes, and I hope to be able to thank you for participating. I truly appreciate your time.

If you have already completed this survey after receiving an email from me recently, you can disregard this letter.

If you have any questions or difficulties accessing the survey, please email me at [redacted] or call [redacted]-[redacted]

Sincerely,

[redacted]

P.S. If you are missing a gift card from a previous survey, please email me at [redacted] so that I can resend it to you.

7 Sample Demographics

Table OA2 summarizes the sample demographics at each stage.

Sample	Mailed Invitation	Baseline Survey Respondent	Invited to RCT	Agreed to RCT	Selected for RCT	Midline Survey Respondent	Endline Survey Respondent
Count	223572	14849	5536	912	763	744	727
Age	53.86 (56)	56.47 (59)	58.6 (61)	53.05 (55)	53.51 (56)	53.37 (55)	53.46 (55)
Voted 16G (0/1)	0.8 (1)	0.88 (1)	0.91 (1)	0.89 (1)	0.9 (1)	0.9 (1)	0.89 (1)
Voted 16P (0/1)	0.19 (0)	0.24 (0)	0.27 (0)	0.26 (0)	0.28 (0)	0.28 (0)	0.28 (0)
Reg. GOP (0/1)	0.69 (1)	0.67 (1)	0.82 (1)	0.8 (1)	0.82 (1)	0.82 (1)	0.82 (1)
Reg. Dem. (0/1)	0.18 (0)	0.21 (0)	0.08 (0)	0.1 (0)	0.09 (0)	0.08 (0)	0.09 (0)
White (0/1)	0.91 (1)	0.93 (1)	0.95 (1)	0.95 (1)	0.95 (1)	0.95 (1)	0.95 (1)
Female (0/1)	0.53 (1)	0.52 (1)	0.5 (0)	0.51 (1)	0.51 (1)	0.51 (1)	0.51 (1)
log CNN Min.	NA (NA)	0.42 (0)	0.41 (0)	0.45 (0)	0.44 (0)	0.44 (0)	0.45 (0)
log Fox Min.	NA (NA)	3.45 (3.7)	3.51 (3.73)	3.44 (3.69)	3.46 (3.69)	3.45 (3.69)	3.45 (3.69)
log All Min.	NA (NA)	4.03 (4.29)	4.06 (4.3)	3.97 (4.28)	3.99 (4.27)	3.98 (4.27)	3.99 (4.27)
Self-Reported Weekly Fox Min.	NA (NA)	483.58 (150)	856.14 (630)	770.77 (600)	839.61 (630)	841.67 (630)	842.91 (630)
Trump Thermometer (0-100)	NA (NA)	59.32 (70)	83.02 (90)	79.44 (87)	82.54 (90)	82.35 (90)	82.17 (90)
Fox News Thermometer (0-100)	NA (NA)	54.28 (51)	74.09 (79)	72.54 (75)	74.76 (79)	74.86 (79)	74.57 (78)
CNN Thermometer (0-100)	NA (NA)	30.88 (25)	12.15 (1)	13.06 (4)	11.74 (1)	11.65 (1)	11.73 (1)
Ideology (1-9)	NA (NA)	5.98 (6)	7.15 (7)	7.03 (7)	7.16 (7)	7.16 (7)	7.15 (7)
Party Identification (1-7)	NA (NA)	3.02 (3)	1.94 (1)	1.97 (1)	1.85 (1)	1.85 (1)	1.86 (1)
Percent Political Knowledge Qs Correct (0-1)	NA (NA)	0.69 (0.75)	0.74 (0.75)	0.74 (0.75)	0.76 (0.75)	0.76 (1)	0.76 (0.75)
Education (1-7)	NA (NA)	5.17 (6)	5.01 (6)	5.25 (6)	5.22 (6)	5.25 (6)	5.26 (6)

Note:
Means are printed first with medians in parantheses. Data labelled as NA were not collected and are unavailable. All other data was measured pre-treatment. TV minutes are log(1+min) for each network. Data is from the pre-treatment May-July period. Ideology is coded as 1 = Extremely Liberal; 9 = Extremely Conservative. Party identification is coded as 1 = Strong Republican; 7 = Strong Democrat. Education is coded as 1 = no high school; 2 = high school; 3 = associates degree; 4 = vocational degree; 5 = some college; 6 = bachelors degree; 7 = graduate degree. Four political knowledge questions were asked. We report the percent correct across all four. These questions measured House control, John Robert's job title, the issue covered by Dodd-Frank, and the number of years in a Senate term.

Table OA2: Sample Characteristics at Each Stage

Figure OA2 shows this graphically.

Figure OA2: Sample Characteristics at Each Stage



Figure OA3 also provides the *self-reported* TV viewership survey responses among the 763 subjects included in the experiment.

Figure OA3: Baseline Self-Reported TV Viewership by Network



8 Covariate Balance at Each Stage

The below tables demonstrate that balance on pre-treatment observable attributes is maintained among the original universe of pre-survey respondents randomized to each group, the sub-sample that responded to the midline survey and the sub-sample that responded to the endline survey. Each table shows the mean value for the covariate (measured in the baseline survey before treatment) under each condition as well as the p-value from a one-way ANOVA test. The first table considers all voters who were randomly assigned after having taken the pre-surveys; the second table considers all voters who responded to the midline survey; the third table considers all voters who responded to endline survey.

	Control (No Incentive)	Treatment (CNN Incentive)	p-value
Baseline Partisanship Factor	0.01	-0.02	0.6
Baseline CNN Factor	0.01	-0.02	0.61
Baseline Fox Factor	-0.01	0.01	0.76
Number of Survey Respondents in Household	1.18	1.17	0.76
Number of Hours Available for Incentivizing	5.85	5.85	0.99
Age	53.21	53.95	0.51
Voted 2016 General (0/1)	0.91	0.88	0.34
Voted 2016 Primary (0/1)	0.27	0.30	0.36
Registered Democrat (0/1)	0.08	0.09	0.85
White (0/1)	0.95	0.95	0.7
Female (0/1)	0.51	0.50	0.81
Trump Thermometer (0-100) at Baseline	81.89	83.52	0.3
Ideological Self-Placement (1-9) at Baseline	7.15	7.17	0.85
Education (1-7) at Baseline	5.29	5.12	0.17
Party Identification (1-7) at Baseline	1.84	1.88	0.6
Reinterview Rate from Baseline Survey	100.00	100.00	-
N	459.00	304.00	-

Table OA3: Covariate Balance among Pre-Survey Respondents.

	Control (No Incentive)	Treatment (CNN Incentive)	p-value
Baseline Partisanship Factor	0.02	-0.01	0.68
Baseline CNN Factor	0.01	-0.02	0.6
Baseline Fox Factor	0.00	0.02	0.77
Number of Survey Respondents in Household	1.18	1.18	0.9
Number of Hours Available for Incentivizing	5.86	5.87	0.92
Age	53.20	53.65	0.69
Voted 2016 General (0/1)	0.91	0.88	0.34
Voted 2016 Primary (0/1)	0.26	0.30	0.36
Registered Democrat (0/1)	0.08	0.09	0.84
White (0/1)	0.95	0.96	0.61
Female (0/1)	0.51	0.51	0.86
Trump Thermometer (0-100) at Baseline	81.78	83.23	0.36
Ideological Self-Placement (1-9) at Baseline	7.16	7.17	0.93
Education (1-7) at Baseline	5.29	5.18	0.35
Party Identification (1-7) at Baseline	1.84	1.88	0.6
Reinterview Rate from Baseline Survey	98.69	95.72	-
N	453.00	291.00	-

Table OA4: Covariate Balance among Midline Survey Respondents

	Control (No Incentive)	Treatment (CNN Incentive)	p-value
Baseline Partisanship Factor	0.02	0.00	0.77
Baseline CNN Factor	0.01	-0.01	0.7
Baseline Fox Factor	0.00	0.01	0.79
Number of Survey Respondents in Household	1.18	1.18	0.94
Number of Hours Available for Incentivizing	5.88	5.88	0.95
Age	53.23	53.83	0.61
Voted 2016 General (0/1)	0.90	0.88	0.32
Voted 2016 Primary (0/1)	0.27	0.30	0.44
Registered Democrat (0/1)	0.08	0.09	0.69
White (0/1)	0.95	0.95	0.89
Female (0/1)	0.50	0.52	0.76
Trump Thermometer (0-100) at Baseline	81.53	83.19	0.3
Ideological Self-Placement (1-9) at Baseline	7.15	7.14	0.95
Education (1-7) at Baseline	5.30	5.21	0.5
Party Identification (1-7) at Baseline	1.84	1.89	0.55
Reinterview Rate from Baseline Survey	96.73	93.09	-
N	444.00	283.00	-

Table OA5: Covariate Balance among Endline Survey Respondents

9 Test of Differential Attrition and Differential Attrtition by Pre-Treatment Covariates

The above subsection demonstrated that at each stage, there was covariate balance. We next examine whether there is evidence of differential attrition.

First, we do find evidence of a small amount of average differential attrition: the control group response rate to the midline survey was 98.7% while the treatment group response rate was 95.7%, a difference of 3.0 percentage points ($p = 0.02$). This difference is substantively small, however. To test whether attrition patterns are similar by covariates in treatment and control, we use a linear regression of whether or not an individual responded to each follow-up survey on treatment, baseline covariates used in blocking, and treatment-covariate interactions. We then perform a heteroskedasticity-robust F-test of the hypothesis that all the interaction coefficients are zero. This procedure was pre-specified in our pre-analysis plan and is standard practice Gerber and Green (2012). Below we report the p-value of this F-test. Based on the results presented in the Table below, there does not appear to be evidence of asymmetrical attrition.

Midline Survey	0.77
Endline Survey	0.81

Table OA6: p-value by Survey Wave Test of Differential Attrition by Covariates Used in Blocking.

See Section 13 for Horowitz-Manski bounds.

10 Description of Estimation and Inference Procedure

Following our pre-analysis plan, to estimate all treatment effects, for each outcome variable, we first used a 20-fold elastic net regression with this outcome and our pre-registered, pre-treatment covariates. These covariates were:

- The log of the pre-treatment minutes watched of CNN.
- The log of the pre-treatment minutes watched of Fox News
- The log of the pre-treatment minutes watched of total TV.

- A baseline partisanship factor.
- A baseline CNN factor.
- A baseline factor on Fox watching behavior.
- Household size.
- The number of hours each person was eligible to be incentivized.
- All variables on the pre-treatment t0 and t1 surveys.

This first regression does not include the treatment indicator. We then extract the variables with non-zero coefficients from this eleastic net regression and use them in a second regression. This second regression regresses the outcome variable on the treatment indicator and the pre-treatment covariates extracted from the elastic net regression. The coefficient on the treatment indicator is the covariate-adjusted treatment effect. This second regression is also clustered at the household level for our standard errors.

This procedure is described in Belloni, Chernozhukov and Hansen (2014) and Bloniarz et al. (2016). For a similar application in political science, see Fang, Guess and Humphreys (2019).

In the main text, we report three types of p-values, which we pre-registered we would do. These different p-values use different approaches to adjust for multiple comparisons:

- Family-wise error rate (FWER) adjusted p-values: This uses the `wyoung` command in Stata Jones, Molitor and Reif (2019). This command controls the family-wise error rate (FWER) when performing multiple hypothesis tests using the free step-down resampling method of Westfall and Young (1993). We pre-registered which outcome variable belongs to which family. We run the `wyoung` command once per family. We do not compute FWER-adjusted p-values for indices themselves. The FWER is the probability of making any Type 1 errors at all. This analysis is very computationally intensive and required the use of a cluster over the course of multiple days in order to run. Each iteration of `wyoung` had 10,000 bootstraps.
- False discovery rate (FDR) sharpened q-values: This uses Anderson (2008)'s code, following the approaches used in Chen and Yang (2019) and Allcott et al. (2020). The FDR is the expected proportion of false rejections out of all rejections.
- Conventional, unadjusted p-values: These are the p-values from the second regression described above. Reporting these p-values follows the convention used by Jones, Molitor and Reif (2019) to report both adjusted and unadjusted p-values.

11 Regression Results and p-values

The below tables print the treatment effect, standard error, and p-values for each every survey item and index in the quizzes, midline, and endline surveys. In each table, the columns are:

- Index: The pre-registered index to which this item belongs. Rows with a - do not belong to any index because they were exploratory outcomes.
- Item: A summary of the survey measure. Rows with a (-) are reverse-coded. Rows that begin with INDEX are the index measures rather than the survey items. All items and indices are standardized to mean 0, SD 1.
- Family: The pre-registered family to which this item belongs. This is used when calculating the family-wise error rate.
- Effect: This is the covariate-adjusted treatment effect from the procedure described above.
- SE: This is the standard error of the covariate-adjusted treatment effect.
- p-val.: This is the unadjusted p-value of the covariate-adjusted treatment effect.
- q-val.: This is the FDR sharpened q-value from Anderson (2008).
- W&Y p-val.: This is the FWER adjusted p-value from the `wyoung` command. As described above, we do not calculate this W&Y p-value for any indices.
- Item of Int.: This is a pre-registered flag for whether an individual item was considered an item of particular interest.

11.1 Quiz Survey Results

Table OA7: Effect on Quiz Surveys

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Quiz
	I was surprised by what I saw on TV	TV Experience	0.259	0.082	0.002	0.005	0.694	1
	Trust - MSNBC	-	0.152	0.055	0.006	0.025	NA	1
	I learned something new on TV	TV Experience	-0.024	0.080	0.761	0.491	1.000	1
	I enjoyed watching TV	TV Experience	-0.294	0.076	0.000	0.001	0.548	1
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	INDEX: Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index		0.065	0.030	0.030	0.055	NA	1
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) Major media outlets are responsible for encouraging the violent protests that occurred last week.	Agree/Disagree	0.232	0.069	0.001	0.006	0.469	1
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) It is an overreaction to go out and protest in response to the police shooting of Jacob Blake in Kenosha, Wisconsin.	Agree/Disagree	0.177	0.068	0.009	0.033	0.808	1
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) Donald Trump's visit to Kenosha, Wisconsin will help calm the situation in the city.	Agree/Disagree	0.172	0.100	0.085	0.159	0.983	1
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	It is not appropriate for a sitting Secretary of State to speak at a political convention.	Agree/Disagree	-0.045	0.104	0.666	0.614	1.000	1
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) Former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn should have his guilty plea of lying under oath thrown out and he should be released immediately.	Agree/Disagree	-0.052	0.061	0.392	0.493	0.999	1
CNN Attitudes Index	Trust - CNN	Media Attitudes	0.196	0.060	0.001	0.005	0.017	1
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	INDEX: Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index		0.146	0.046	0.002	0.007	NA	1
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	T/F: The Republican National Convention had to pull a speaker from its lineup because it was revealed that she had shared anti-Jewish conspiracy theories on social media.	T/F	0.284	0.117	0.015	0.050	0.961	1
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	T/F: Kyle Rittenhouse, the 17-year-old who shot and killed two people at the Kenosha protest, is a Trump supporter.	T/F	0.265	0.118	0.025	0.071	0.972	1

Table OA7: Effect on Quiz Surveys *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Quiz
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	(-) T/F: Joe Biden expressed support for the protests that occurred last week in Kenosha, Wisconsin.	T/F	0.210	0.120	0.081	0.159	0.993	1
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	(-) T/F: Jacob Blake, who was recently shot by police in Kenosha, Wisconsin, was armed with a knife and had engaged in a violent struggle with officers moments before officers shot him.	T/F	0.122	0.112	0.277	0.373	1.000	1
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	T/F: The protests in Kenosha, Wisconsin last week did not destroy any property.	T/F	-0.042	0.101	0.674	0.614	1.000	1
Fox Attitudes Index	(-) Trust - Fox News	Media Attitudes	-0.049	0.050	0.330	0.284	0.935	1
General Media Attitudes Index	INDEX: General Media Attitudes Index		0.052	0.064	0.417	0.375	NA	1
General Media Attitudes Index	The media in general	Media Attitudes	0.079	0.062	0.208	0.198	0.862	1
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	INDEX: Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index		0.115	0.056	0.041	0.060	NA	1
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	Saw Positive news about Joe Biden	TV Experience	0.424	0.117	0.000	0.003	0.626	1
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	Saw Negative news about Donald Trump	TV Experience	0.181	0.068	0.008	0.033	0.867	1
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	(-) Saw Negative news about Joe Biden	TV Experience	0.017	0.122	0.887	0.763	1.000	1
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	(-) Saw Positive news about Donald Trump	TV Experience	-0.065	0.113	0.568	0.585	1.000	1
Short-Term Emotion Index	INDEX: Short-Term Emotion Index		0.054	0.052	0.295	0.280	NA	1
Short-Term Emotion Index	Happy	Emotion	0.069	0.066	0.296	0.395	0.941	1
Short-Term Emotion Index	(-) Anxious	Emotion	0.061	0.066	0.362	0.472	0.964	1
	I was surprised by what I saw on TV	TV Experience	0.264	0.123	0.032	0.062	0.967	2
	Trust - MSNBC	-	0.057	0.056	0.310	0.403	NA	2
	I learned something new on TV	TV Experience	-0.027	0.127	0.833	0.491	1.000	2
	I enjoyed watching TV	TV Experience	-0.407	0.080	0.000	0.001	0.209	2
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	INDEX: Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index		0.102	0.030	0.001	0.005	NA	2

Table OA7: Effect on Quiz Surveys *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Quiz
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) It is an overreaction to go out and protest in response to the police shooting of Jacob Blake in Kenosha, Wisconsin.	Agree/Disagree	0.444	0.117	0.000	0.003	0.399	2
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) Major media outlets are responsible for encouraging the violent protests that occurred last week.	Agree/Disagree	0.190	0.072	0.009	0.033	0.805	2
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) Donald Trump's visit to Kenosha, Wisconsin will help calm the situation in the city.	Agree/Disagree	0.115	0.064	0.072	0.159	0.982	2
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	It is not appropriate for a sitting Secretary of State to speak at a political convention.	Agree/Disagree	0.049	0.077	0.525	0.576	1.000	2
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) Former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn should have his guilty plea of lying under oath thrown out and he should be released immediately.	Agree/Disagree	-0.038	0.056	0.500	0.571	1.000	2
CNN Attitudes Index	Trust - CNN	Media Attitudes	0.104	0.062	0.095	0.113	0.632	2
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	INDEX: Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index		0.213	0.041	0.000	0.001	NA	2
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	T/F: Kyle Rittenhouse, the 17-year-old who shot and killed two people at the Kenosha protest, is a Trump supporter.	T/F	0.373	0.121	0.002	0.010	0.851	2
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	(-) T/F: Jacob Blake, who was recently shot by police in Kenosha, Wisconsin, was armed with a knife and had engaged in a violent struggle with officers moments before officers shot him.	T/F	0.287	0.079	0.000	0.003	0.665	2
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	T/F: The Republican National Convention had to pull a speaker from its lineup because it was revealed that she had shared anti-Jewish conspiracy theories on social media.	T/F	0.225	0.122	0.066	0.149	0.993	2

Table OA7: Effect on Quiz Surveys *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Quiz
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	(-) T/F: Joe Biden expressed support for the protests that occurred last week in Kenosha, Wisconsin.	T/F	0.105	0.081	0.191	0.266	0.999	2
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	T/F: The protests in Kenosha, Wisconsin last week did not destroy any property.	T/F	0.054	0.107	0.614	0.611	1.000	2
Fox Attitudes Index	(-) Trust - Fox News	Media Attitudes	0.027	0.049	0.588	0.443	0.979	2
General Media Attitudes Index	INDEX: General Media Attitudes Index		-0.044	0.065	0.497	0.456	NA	2
General Media Attitudes Index	The media in general	Media Attitudes	-0.035	0.065	0.584	0.443	0.979	2
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	INDEX: Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index		0.148	0.050	0.003	0.010	NA	2
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	Saw Positive news about Joe Biden	TV Experience	0.413	0.116	0.000	0.004	0.631	2
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	Saw Negative news about Donald Trump	TV Experience	0.339	0.102	0.001	0.006	0.686	2
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	(-) Saw Negative news about Joe Biden	TV Experience	-0.008	0.129	0.948	0.814	1.000	2
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	(-) Saw Positive news about Donald Trump	TV Experience	-0.016	0.109	0.881	0.763	1.000	2
Short-Term Emotion Index	INDEX: Short-Term Emotion Index		0.026	0.053	0.631	0.508	NA	2
Short-Term Emotion Index	(-) Anxious	Emotion	0.057	0.072	0.425	0.519	0.971	2
Short-Term Emotion Index	Happy	Emotion	0.031	0.071	0.666	0.614	0.993	2
	I was surprised by what I saw on TV	TV Experience	0.321	0.101	0.001	0.005	0.694	3
	Trust - MSNBC	-	0.046	0.057	0.427	0.519	NA	3
	I learned something new on TV	TV Experience	-0.054	0.116	0.639	0.470	1.000	3
	I enjoyed watching TV	TV Experience	-0.307	0.075	0.000	0.001	0.467	3
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	INDEX: Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index		0.072	0.031	0.021	0.040	NA	3
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) Allowing so many people to vote by mail will inevitably lead to widespread fraud in the elections.	Agree/Disagree	0.196	0.096	0.042	0.109	0.962	3

Table OA7: Effect on Quiz Surveys *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Quiz
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) If I were walking down the street in New York City or Portland right now, it would probably feel like being in a war zone.	Agree/Disagree	0.193	0.109	0.076	0.159	0.983	3
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	I think Donald Trump probably did have a series of small strokes last year.	Agree/Disagree	0.129	0.083	0.119	0.206	0.986	3
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) If Joe Biden is elected President, the protests in America's cities will only get more violent.	Agree/Disagree	0.116	0.067	0.085	0.159	0.983	3
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) What Joe Biden has been saying about the ongoing protests has only made the protests more violent.	Agree/Disagree	0.107	0.103	0.299	0.395	0.998	3
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	There is a risk that the government will approve a vaccine for COVID-19 before it is proven to be safe and effective.	Agree/Disagree	-0.013	0.097	0.894	0.763	1.000	3
CNN Attitudes Index	Trust - CNN	Media Attitudes	0.109	0.057	0.056	0.082	0.476	3
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	INDEX: Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index		0.121	0.024	0.000	0.001	NA	3
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	T/F: Donald Trump said that people have seen planes full of "looters" and "thugs" who are "looking for trouble" flying into cities experiencing protests.	T/F	0.416	0.111	0.000	0.003	0.628	3
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	T/F: The Department of Homeland Security recently warned that the Russian government is promoting claims that mail-in voting encourages fraud in order to undermine confidence in the 2020 election.	T/F	0.246	0.099	0.014	0.046	0.961	3
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	(-) T/F: When he visited Kenosha, Wisconsin, Donald Trump met with the family of Jacob Blake, the 29-year-old African American man who was shot by local police.	T/F	0.231	0.069	0.001	0.006	0.761	3

Table OA7: Effect on Quiz Surveys *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Quiz
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	(-) T/F: Donald Trump condemned his supporters who fired paintball guns at Black Lives Matters protestors.	T/F	0.201	0.105	0.056	0.129	0.992	3
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	T/F: Joe Biden issued a statement condemning violence by Black Lives Matter activists.	T/F	0.049	0.075	0.513	0.576	1.000	3
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	T/F: Over 187,000 Americans have died from COVID-19.	T/F	0.032	0.113	0.775	0.728	1.000	3
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	T/F: President Donald Trump referred to US soldiers who died in combat and are buried at the Aisne-Marne cemetery as ”losers” and ”suckers.”	T/F	-0.011	0.065	0.859	0.760	1.000	3
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	(-) T/F: Nancy Pelosi recently got a haircut in San Francisco but did not wear a mask, in violation of local health regulations.	T/F	-0.090	0.129	0.487	0.571	1.000	3
Fox Attitudes Index	(-) Trust - Fox News	Media Attitudes	-0.035	0.054	0.517	0.443	0.979	3
General Media Attitudes Index	INDEX: General Media Attitudes Index		-0.011	0.065	0.862	0.741	NA	3
General Media Attitudes Index	The media in general	Media Attitudes	-0.001	0.067	0.993	0.573	0.991	3
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	INDEX: Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index		0.106	0.037	0.004	0.011	NA	3
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	Saw Positive news about Joe Biden	TV Experience	0.386	0.102	0.000	0.003	0.576	3
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	Saw Negative news about Donald Trump	TV Experience	0.180	0.103	0.081	0.159	0.983	3
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	(-) Saw Positive news about Donald Trump	TV Experience	0.021	0.109	0.847	0.760	1.000	3
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	(-) Saw Negative news about Joe Biden	TV Experience	-0.019	0.107	0.857	0.760	1.000	3
Short-Term Emotion Index	INDEX: Short-Term Emotion Index		0.005	0.055	0.931	0.769	NA	3
Short-Term Emotion Index	Happy	Emotion	0.049	0.067	0.468	0.571	0.976	3
Short-Term Emotion Index	(-) Anxious	Emotion	-0.018	0.066	0.786	0.730	0.993	3
	I was surprised by what I saw on TV	TV Experience	0.187	0.076	0.014	0.032	0.914	4
	Trust - MSNBC	-	0.111	0.055	0.043	0.109	NA	4

Table OA7: Effect on Quiz Surveys *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Quiz
	I learned something new on TV	TV Experience	-0.183	0.073	0.013	0.032	0.906	4
	I enjoyed watching TV	TV Experience	-0.289	0.079	0.000	0.002	0.609	4
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	INDEX: Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index		0.087	0.030	0.003	0.010	NA	4
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	The coronavirus is still infecting huge numbers of Americans every day.	Agree/Disagree	0.215	0.066	0.001	0.007	0.512	4
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) If I were walking down the street in cities like Portland right now, it would probably feel like being in a war zone.	Agree/Disagree	0.212	0.106	0.045	0.110	0.962	4
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	Given what he knew about the coronavirus back in February, President Trump probably should have more strongly warned Americans about the coronavirus.	Agree/Disagree	0.131	0.060	0.030	0.083	0.938	4
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	Because of the risk of spreading coronavirus, Donald Trump and Joe Biden should not be holding campaign rallies.	Agree/Disagree	0.129	0.056	0.021	0.062	0.906	4
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) If elected President, Joe Biden would be more likely to start another war in the next four years than Donald Trump.	Agree/Disagree	0.106	0.068	0.121	0.206	0.986	4
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) Joe Biden's positions are now about as far left as the most radical and socialist politicians out there.	Agree/Disagree	0.039	0.090	0.664	0.614	1.000	4
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) The Democratic Party's views on race are so extreme, even most black people think they are harmful.	Agree/Disagree	-0.003	0.110	0.975	0.824	1.000	4
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) California's bad forestry management, and not climate change, is the primary cause of their wildfires.	Agree/Disagree	-0.134	0.095	0.159	0.246	0.988	4
CNN Attitudes Index	Trust - CNN	Media Attitudes	0.075	0.059	0.207	0.198	0.862	4
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	INDEX: Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index		0.069	0.029	0.019	0.040	NA	4

Table OA7: Effect on Quiz Surveys *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Quiz
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	(-) T/F: Donald Trump's campaign is taking significant safety precautions at its rallies to reduce the risk that rally attendees spread the coronavirus to each other.	T/F	0.338	0.071	0.000	0.001	0.309	4
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	T/F: Back in February, Donald Trump admitted privately that he knew the coronavirus was much more deadly than the flu.	T/F	0.235	0.101	0.020	0.062	0.968	4
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	(-) T/F: Members of the Mueller investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election intentionally "wiped" their phones, in violation of federal record keeping laws.	T/F	0.072	0.105	0.493	0.571	1.000	4
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	(-) T/F: Most polls show that the Presidential election is basically tied between Trump and Biden in key swing states.	T/F	-0.122	0.069	0.079	0.159	0.993	4
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	(-) T/F: Donald Trump last week banned diversity trainings for government staff that incorporate teachings about "critical race theory" and "white privilege".	T/F	-0.127	0.097	0.194	0.266	0.999	4
Fox Attitudes Index	(-) Trust - Fox News	Media Attitudes	0.054	0.055	0.331	0.284	0.935	4
General Media Attitudes Index	INDEX: General Media Attitudes Index		-0.054	0.061	0.375	0.343	NA	4
General Media Attitudes Index	The media in general	Media Attitudes	-0.038	0.062	0.538	0.443	0.979	4
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	INDEX: Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index		0.228	0.055	0.000	0.001	NA	4
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	Saw Positive news about Joe Biden	TV Experience	0.494	0.107	0.000	0.001	0.311	4
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	Saw Negative news about Donald Trump	TV Experience	0.278	0.065	0.000	0.001	0.394	4
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	(-) Saw Negative news about Joe Biden	TV Experience	0.092	0.112	0.411	0.517	1.000	4
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	(-) Saw Positive news about Donald Trump	TV Experience	0.013	0.113	0.908	0.768	1.000	4

Table OA7: Effect on Quiz Surveys *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Quiz
Short-Term Emotion Index	INDEX: Short-Term Emotion Index		0.004	0.057	0.951	0.769	NA	4
Short-Term Emotion Index	Happy	Emotion	0.003	0.069	0.969	0.824	0.993	4
Short-Term Emotion Index	(-) Anxious	Emotion	-0.023	0.065	0.721	0.672	0.993	4
	I was surprised by what I saw on TV	TV Experience	0.213	0.111	0.056	0.082	0.975	5
	Trust - MSNBC	-	0.103	0.062	0.098	0.173	NA	5
	I learned something new on TV	TV Experience	-0.231	0.111	0.037	0.062	0.967	5
	I enjoyed watching TV	TV Experience	-0.329	0.077	0.000	0.001	0.391	5
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	INDEX: Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index		0.118	0.037	0.002	0.007	NA	5
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) Allowing so many people to vote by mail will inevitably lead to widespread fraud in the elections.	Agree/Disagree	0.405	0.092	0.000	0.001	0.246	5
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) If Joe Biden is elected President, we'll see many police get shot by Black Lives Matter activists.	Agree/Disagree	0.279	0.066	0.000	0.001	0.271	5
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	Climate change probably played a role in the recent wildfires on the West Coast.	Agree/Disagree	0.130	0.065	0.046	0.110	0.962	5
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	President Trump should wait to nominate a Supreme Court Justice to replace Ruth Bader Ginsburg; instead, the winner of this November's presidential election should pick the nominee – whether that is Trump or Biden.	Agree/Disagree	0.098	0.067	0.140	0.235	0.986	5
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) Donald Trump should nominate a Supreme Court Justice who will overturn Roe v. Wade, the court case that gives women a constiutional right to receive an abortion.	Agree/Disagree	0.096	0.067	0.155	0.246	0.988	5
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) Coronavirus cases are falling quickly in America and the virus will be basically gone fairly soon.	Agree/Disagree	0.028	0.065	0.669	0.614	1.000	5

Table OA7: Effect on Quiz Surveys *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Quiz
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) I think many Biden supporters are probably happy to see it when police officers get shot.	Agree/Disagree	-0.032	0.097	0.742	0.690	1.000	5
Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period Index	(-) There's a good chance that the coronavirus was actually man-made in a Chinese laboratory.	Agree/Disagree	-0.033	0.069	0.627	0.611	1.000	5
CNN Attitudes Index	Trust - CNN	Media Attitudes	0.128	0.061	0.036	0.062	0.357	5
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	INDEX: Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index		0.052	0.046	0.261	0.280	NA	5
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	(-) T/F: Elementary schools across America are now teaching children to believe the key messages of the Black Lives Matter movement.	T/F	0.086	0.123	0.487	0.571	1.000	5
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	T/F: Olivia Troye, a former counterterrorism adviser to Vice President Pence, endorsed Joe Biden for President.	T/F	0.062	0.114	0.586	0.591	1.000	5
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	(-) T/F: The person who shot two police officers in Los Angeles said he was inspired by the Black Lives Matter movement to do so.	T/F	0.048	0.076	0.525	0.576	1.000	5
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	T/F: In 2016, Senator Lindsey Graham said that presidents should not nominate Supreme Court justices in a Presidential election year.	T/F	0.026	0.114	0.817	0.760	1.000	5
Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period Index	(-) T/F: Last week, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain signed a Middle East peace deal at the White House.	T/F	-0.024	0.110	0.825	0.760	1.000	5
Fox Attitudes Index	(-) Trust - Fox News	Media Attitudes	0.077	0.057	0.174	0.182	0.826	5
General Media Attitudes Index	INDEX: General Media Attitudes Index		0.010	0.065	0.878	0.741	NA	5
General Media Attitudes Index	The media in general	Media Attitudes	0.022	0.065	0.740	0.491	0.979	5
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	INDEX: Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index		0.178	0.037	0.000	0.001	NA	5
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	Saw Negative news about Donald Trump	TV Experience	0.323	0.100	0.001	0.007	0.694	5

Table OA7: Effect on Quiz Surveys *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Quiz
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	Saw Positive news about Joe Biden	TV Experience	0.229	0.073	0.002	0.008	0.694	5
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	(-) Saw Positive news about Donald Trump	TV Experience	0.147	0.111	0.188	0.266	0.998	5
Partisan Valence of News Exposure Index	(-) Saw Negative news about Joe Biden	TV Experience	0.130	0.102	0.203	0.275	0.998	5
Short-Term Emotion Index	INDEX: Short-Term Emotion Index		-0.014	0.057	0.802	0.707	NA	5
Short-Term Emotion Index	Happy	Emotion	0.012	0.070	0.863	0.760	0.993	5
Short-Term Emotion Index	(-) Anxious	Emotion	-0.047	0.066	0.473	0.571	0.976	5

11.2 Midline Survey Results

We first present a table summarizing each index and providing an example survey item within that index. Next, we present the numerical results for the treatment effect on each index and item within that index.

Table OA8: Example Survey Items in Midline Survey

Index	Example Survey Item
Liberal Perceptions of Events Fox Covered (Non-COVID)	True/False: Donald Trump only paid $750 in federal income taxes the year he won the presidency.
Liberal Perceptions of Events CNN Covered (Non-COVID)	True/False: There is much more violent crime in big cities in America than there used to be.
COVID Attitudes	The government should be doing more to stop the spread of coronavirus.
CNN (vs. Fox)-Consistent Issue Importance	Violent protests are more important than COVID for President to focus on (reverse coded).
Liberal Preferences on Covered Issues	States should allow voters to vote by mail in the 2020 election.
Liberal Preferences on Non-Covered Issues	The government should do much more to help the needy.
Reduced Knowledge of Fox-Covered Biden "Positions"	Biden supports: Eliminate all funding for the police (reverse coded).
Reduced Knowledge of Fox-Covered Trump Positions	True/False: Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain recently signed a Middle East peace deal at the White House.
Increased Knowledge of CNN-Covered Biden Positions	True/False: A large number of former military leaders and former Republican leaders have endorsed Joe Biden for President.
Increased Knowledge of CNN-Covered Trump Positions	True/False: Back in February, Donald Trump admitted privately that he knew the coronavirus was much more deadly than the flu.
Reduced Trump Evaluation	Feeling thermometer: President Donald Trump
Biden Evaluation	Feeling thermometer: Former Vice President Joe Biden
Democratic-Leaning General Political Preferences	Party Identification.
Unfavorable Fox Attitudes	Feeling thermometer: Fox News
Favorable CNN Attitudes	Feeling thermometer: CNN
General Media Attitudes	Journalists must always be free to criticize our political leaders.
Self-reported Substitute News Source Use	Local newspaper use during treatment period.
Self-reported Reduced During-Treatment Fox News Viewership	Fox Min Watched Per Week During Treatment Period.
Affect towards Democratic voters	Feeling thermometer: Democratic party voters.
Reduced Affect towards Republican voters	Feeling thermometer: Republican party voters (reverse coded).
Second Order Beliefs about Liberalism of Average American	Expected Trump Vote Share in 2020 Presidential Election (reverse coded).
Support for Democratic Norms	When possible, Republican politicians should try to compromise with Democratic politicians to get things done.
Reduced Racial Prejudice	Feeling thermometer: Blacks
Reduced Ethnic Antagonism	A time will come when patriotic Americans have to take the law into their own hands (reverse coded).

Table OA9: Effect on Midline Survey

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
-	CNN Min Watched Per Week During Treatment Period	During-Treatment Viewership	0.788	0.071	0.000	0.001	0.000	TRUE
-	Hrs of CNN Watched Yesterday	Post-Treatment Viewership	0.190	0.107	0.076	0.211	0.387	TRUE
-	(-) During-Treatment Viewership of Fox Shows Not During Incentivized Hours	During-Treatment Viewership	0.153	0.056	0.006	0.064	0.014	FALSE
-	(-) T/F: It was recently discovered that many countries were making tests for COVID-19 as long ago as 2018, suggesting that some powerful people knew the coronavirus was coming many years ago.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.151	0.097	0.121	0.429	0.996	FALSE
-	Feeling therm: New York Times	Media Attitudes	0.118	0.054	0.029	0.219	0.711	FALSE
-	(-) Hrs of Fox Watched Yesterday	Post-Treatment Viewership	0.095	0.061	0.122	0.225	0.387	TRUE
-	Likely to watch CNN in the future	Post-Treatment Viewership	0.090	0.065	0.166	0.248	0.387	TRUE
-	Would enjoy watching CNN	Media Attitudes	0.090	0.063	0.155	0.248	0.972	TRUE
-	(-) Would enjoy watching Fox News	Media Attitudes	0.073	0.054	0.172	0.477	0.974	FALSE
-	Saw news that made better understand why people vote for Democrats	Polarization	0.041	0.096	0.669	0.331	0.998	TRUE
-	(-) Likely to watch Fox News in the future	Post-Treatment Viewership	0.037	0.063	0.558	0.331	0.562	TRUE
-	Saw news that made better understand what Donald Trump has done as President	Exploratory Outcomes	0.029	0.103	0.777	1.000	1.000	FALSE
-	Ideological distance from self: MSNBC	Exploratory Outcomes	0.029	0.069	0.675	1.000	1.000	FALSE
-	I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country.	Exploratory Outcomes	0.028	0.059	0.638	0.972	1.000	FALSE
-	Feeling therm: Hispanics	Exploratory Outcomes	0.010	0.066	0.877	1.000	1.000	FALSE
-	Saw news that made better understand why people vote for Republicans	Exploratory Outcomes	0.010	0.069	0.887	1.000	1.000	FALSE
-	Issue importance: The economy	Agenda Setting	0.001	0.104	0.994	1.000	0.996	FALSE

Table OA9: Effect on Midline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
-	Feeling therm: Asians	Exploratory Outcomes	-0.010	0.065	0.881	1.000	1.000	FALSE
-	Feeling therm: Muslims	Exploratory Outcomes	-0.017	0.057	0.769	1.000	1.000	FALSE
-	Feeling therm: Whites	Exploratory Outcomes	-0.025	0.068	0.713	1.000	1.000	FALSE
-	Trust MSNBC	Media Attitudes	-0.052	0.060	0.384	0.758	0.999	FALSE
-	Feeling therm: Illegal Immigrants	Exploratory Outcomes	-0.063	0.058	0.277	0.624	0.973	FALSE
-	MSNBC Min Watched Per Week During Treatment Period	-	-0.064	0.087	0.466	0.795	NA	FALSE
-	Saw news that made better understand what Joe Biden would do as President	Exploratory Outcomes	-0.132	0.109	0.224	0.555	0.971	FALSE
Affect towards Democratic voters	INDEX: Affect towards Democratic voters		0.033	0.030	0.276	0.234	NA	NA
Affect towards Democratic voters	Trait rating: Democrats open-minded	Polarization	0.120	0.062	0.053	0.311	0.676	FALSE
Affect towards Democratic voters	(-) Trait rating: Democrats selfish	Polarization	0.081	0.060	0.178	0.489	0.940	FALSE
Affect towards Democratic voters	Feeling therm: Democratic party voters	Polarization	0.081	0.054	0.138	0.463	0.913	FALSE
Affect towards Democratic voters	Trait rating: Democrats patriotic	Polarization	0.061	0.055	0.271	0.619	0.970	FALSE
Affect towards Democratic voters	Trait rating: Democrats intelligent	Polarization	0.055	0.056	0.327	0.684	0.980	FALSE
Affect towards Democratic voters	(-) Trait rating: Democrats unreasonable	Polarization	0.040	0.065	0.538	0.919	0.998	FALSE
Affect towards Democratic voters	(-) Trait rating: Democrats mean	Polarization	0.029	0.057	0.614	0.970	0.998	FALSE
Affect towards Democratic voters	(-) Ideological distance from self: The Average Person who Votes for Democrats	Polarization	0.011	0.082	0.894	1.000	0.998	FALSE
Affect towards Democratic voters	Trait rating: Democrats honest	Polarization	-0.009	0.060	0.887	1.000	0.998	FALSE
Affect towards Democratic voters	Would enjoy talking about politics with people who watch CNN	Polarization	-0.032	0.060	0.600	0.970	0.998	FALSE

Table OA9: Effect on Midline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
Affect towards Republican voters	INDEX: Reduced Affect towards Republican voters		0.051	0.031	0.103	0.124	NA	NA
Affect towards Republican voters	(-) Trait rating: Republicans honest	Polarization	0.111	0.056	0.047	0.310	0.650	FALSE
Affect towards Republican voters	(-) Trait rating: Republicans intelligent	Polarization	0.104	0.058	0.074	0.365	0.769	FALSE
Affect towards Republican voters	(-) Feeling therm: Republican party voters	Polarization	0.096	0.057	0.093	0.385	0.824	FALSE
Affect towards Republican voters	Trait rating: Republicans selfish	Polarization	0.093	0.063	0.138	0.463	0.913	FALSE
Affect towards Republican voters	(-) Trait rating: Republicans open-minded	Polarization	0.075	0.056	0.182	0.497	0.940	FALSE
Affect towards Republican voters	Ideological distance from self: The Average Person who Votes for Republicans	Polarization	0.046	0.062	0.454	0.781	0.996	FALSE
Affect towards Republican voters	(-) Trait rating: Republicans patriotic	Polarization	0.035	0.060	0.560	0.939	0.998	FALSE
Affect towards Republican voters	Trait rating: Republicans unreasonable	Polarization	0.020	0.060	0.740	1.000	0.998	FALSE
Affect towards Republican voters	Trait rating: Republicans mean	Polarization	-0.081	0.064	0.202	0.541	0.940	FALSE
Agenda Setting	INDEX: CNN (vs. Fox)-Consistent Issue Importance		0.110	0.036	0.002	0.014	NA	NA
Agenda Setting	(-) Violent protests are more important than COVID for President to focus on.	Agenda Setting	0.298	0.096	0.002	0.015	0.166	TRUE
Agenda Setting	(-) Issue importance: The risk of fraud in the elections	Agenda Setting	0.216	0.098	0.027	0.216	0.462	FALSE
Agenda Setting	(-) Issue importance: Violence in American cities	Agenda Setting	0.113	0.070	0.109	0.401	0.708	FALSE
Agenda Setting	Issue importance: The coronavirus pandemic	Agenda Setting	0.106	0.056	0.060	0.350	0.570	FALSE
Agenda Setting	(-) Issue importance: Danger to American values from people with extreme views on race	Agenda Setting	0.099	0.103	0.335	0.684	0.936	FALSE

Table OA9: Effect on Midline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
Agenda Setting	(-) Issue importance: Danger to America from socialism	Agenda Setting	0.066	0.079	0.403	0.776	0.936	FALSE
Agenda Setting	Issue importance: The environment and climate change	Agenda Setting	-0.013	0.062	0.829	1.000	0.993	FALSE
Agenda Setting	Issue importance: Healthcare	Agenda Setting	-0.016	0.064	0.804	1.000	0.993	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events CNN Covered	INDEX: Liberal Perceptions of Events CNN Covered (Non-COVID)		0.070	0.029	0.015	0.055	NA	NA
Attitudes Towards Events CNN Covered	(-) T/F: Donald Trump's campaign is taking significant safety precautions at its rallies to reduce the risk that rally attendees spread the coronavirus to each other.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.203	0.069	0.003	0.043	0.524	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events CNN Covered	T/F: The Department of Homeland Security recently warned that the Russian government is trying to undermine confidence in the 2020 election by promoting claims that mail-in voting encourages fraud.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.115	0.102	0.260	0.613	0.999	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events CNN Covered	T/F: Russian President Vladimir Putin has been interfering in this year's Presidential election to help Donald Trump.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.109	0.092	0.237	0.566	0.999	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events CNN Covered	T/F: Donald Trump only paid $750 in federal income taxes the year he won the presidency.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.066	0.073	0.365	0.719	0.999	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events CNN Covered	Climate change probably played a role in the recent wildfires on the West Coast.	Views on Current Events	0.058	0.060	0.330	0.684	0.867	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events CNN Covered	T/F: Over 200,000 Americans have died from COVID-19.	Perceptions of Current Events	-0.017	0.072	0.811	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events CNN Covered	(-) If Donald Trump is declared the loser of the election, he will accept the results.	Views on Current Events	-0.030	0.060	0.618	0.970	0.867	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	INDEX: Liberal Perceptions of Events Fox Covered (Non-COVID)		0.139	0.030	0.000	0.001	NA	NA
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) If Joe Biden is elected President, the protests in America's cities will only get more violent.	Views on Current Events	0.292	0.070	0.000	0.007	0.025	FALSE

Table OA9: Effect on Midline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) If Joe Biden is elected President, we'll see many more police get shot by Black Lives Matter activists.	Views on Current Events	0.253	0.087	0.004	0.044	0.192	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) I think many Biden supporters are probably happy to see it when police officers get shot.	Views on Current Events	0.240	0.065	0.000	0.015	0.064	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) Democrats are trying to steal the election with fraudulent mail-in ballots.	Views on Current Events	0.236	0.079	0.003	0.043	0.192	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) If I were walking down the street in New York City or Portland right now, it would probably feel like being in a war zone.	Views on Current Events	0.169	0.097	0.081	0.365	0.682	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) What Joe Biden has been saying about the ongoing protests has only made the protests more violent.	Views on Current Events	0.146	0.089	0.102	0.401	0.682	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) If elected president, Joe Biden will do whatever it is that radical left socialists like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Bernie Sanders tell him to do.	Views on Current Events	0.130	0.081	0.109	0.401	0.682	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) T/F: There is much more violent crime in big cities in America than there used to be.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.130	0.069	0.062	0.352	0.971	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) The Democratic Party's views on race are so extreme, even most black people think they are harmful.	Views on Current Events	0.059	0.064	0.355	0.710	0.867	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) Recent calls to "defund the police" have led to increases in violent crime in American cities.	Views on Current Events	0.055	0.066	0.407	0.776	0.867	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) Blacks are treated just as fairly as whites when dealing with the police.	Views on Current Events	0.016	0.057	0.781	1.000	0.867	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) T/F: Billionaires have been paying to bail rioters out of jail so they can get back on the streets and continue rioting.	Perceptions of Current Events	-0.129	0.100	0.200	0.541	0.999	FALSE
Bartels Ethnic Antagonism	INDEX: Reduced Ethnic Antagonism		0.036	0.072	0.616	0.429	NA	NA

Table OA9: Effect on Midline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
Bartels Ethnic Antagonism	(-) A time will come when patriotic Americans have to take the law into their own hands.	Exploratory Outcomes	0.049	0.065	0.454	0.781	0.997	FALSE
Bartels Ethnic Antagonism	(-) Things have changed so much that I often feel like a stranger in my own country.	Exploratory Outcomes	-0.047	0.097	0.627	0.970	1.000	FALSE
Biden Evaluation	INDEX: Biden Evaluation		0.063	0.035	0.075	0.105	NA	NA
Biden Evaluation	(-) Trait rating: Biden mean	Partisan Attitudes	0.108	0.065	0.096	0.393	0.897	FALSE
Biden Evaluation	Trait rating: Biden honest	Partisan Attitudes	0.101	0.062	0.106	0.401	0.911	FALSE
Biden Evaluation	Feeling therm: Former Vice President Joe Biden	Partisan Attitudes	0.085	0.059	0.152	0.465	0.952	FALSE
Biden Evaluation	Trait rating: Biden patriotic	Partisan Attitudes	0.082	0.057	0.153	0.465	0.952	FALSE
Biden Evaluation	(-) Trait rating: Biden selfish	Partisan Attitudes	0.037	0.067	0.583	0.952	1.000	FALSE
Biden Evaluation	Trait rating: Biden intelligent	Partisan Attitudes	0.017	0.068	0.801	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Biden Evaluation	(-) Ideological distance from self: Former Vice President Joe Biden	Partisan Attitudes	-0.009	0.070	0.897	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Biden Position Perception - CNN-Covered	INDEX: Increased Knowledge of CNN-Covered Biden Positions		0.091	0.062	0.141	0.164	NA	NA
Biden Position Perception - CNN-Covered	T/F: A large number of former military leaders and former Republican leaders have endorsed Joe Biden for President.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.148	0.103	0.152	0.465	0.998	FALSE
Biden Position Perception - CNN-Covered	Biden supports: Create a new government insurance option like Medicare, allowing Americans to keep their private insurance if they want, but also allowing them to choose to have government health insurance if they want it instead.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.012	0.072	0.865	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Biden Position Perception - CNN-Covered	Biden supports: Increase taxes on corporations and wealthy people.	Perceptions of Current Events	-0.017	0.065	0.798	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Biden Position Perception - Fox-Covered	INDEX: Reduced Knowledge of Fox-Covered Biden "Positions"		0.081	0.035	0.021	0.059	NA	NA
Biden Position Perception - Fox-Covered	(-) Biden supports: Eliminate all funding for the police.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.166	0.063	0.008	0.078	0.695	FALSE

Table OA9: Effect on Midline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
Biden Position Perception - Fox-Covered	(-) Biden supports: Tear down statues of anyone who owned slaves, including George Washington.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.092	0.063	0.145	0.465	0.998	FALSE
Biden Position Perception - Fox-Covered	(-) Biden supports: Racial minorities should receive special treatment in hiring and college admissions to make up for past discrimination.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.082	0.094	0.386	0.758	0.999	FALSE
Biden Position Perception - Fox-Covered	T/F: Joe Biden has condemned violence at recent Black Lives Matter protests.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.006	0.101	0.953	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Biden Position Perception - Fox-Covered	(-) Biden supports: Substantially increase government spending by trillions of dollars over the next decade.	Perceptions of Current Events	-0.115	0.091	0.208	0.547	0.999	FALSE
CNN Attitudes	INDEX: Favorable CNN Attitudes		0.014	0.037	0.706	0.429	NA	NA
CNN Attitudes	Trust CNN	Media Attitudes	0.097	0.060	0.105	0.220	0.927	TRUE
CNN Attitudes	Feeling therm: CNN	Media Attitudes	0.083	0.061	0.169	0.474	0.974	FALSE
CNN Attitudes	CNN is good for society.	Media Attitudes	0.078	0.061	0.204	0.541	0.981	FALSE
CNN Attitudes	If Joe Biden did something bad, CNN would discuss it.	Media Attitudes	0.062	0.099	0.532	0.915	1.000	FALSE
CNN Attitudes	If I were to watch CNN next week, I would learn something important that I wouldn't hear on Fox News.	Media Attitudes	0.049	0.087	0.578	0.952	1.000	FALSE
CNN Attitudes	(-) The government should take CNN off the air.	Media Attitudes	0.021	0.061	0.734	1.000	1.000	FALSE
CNN Attitudes	When covering important news stories, CNN tells the whole story.	Media Attitudes	-0.045	0.089	0.612	0.970	1.000	FALSE
CNN Attitudes	(-) Ideological distance from self: CNN	Media Attitudes	-0.053	0.070	0.445	0.781	0.999	FALSE
CNN Attitudes	(-) CNN only covers news stories that help Democrats.	Media Attitudes	-0.099	0.069	0.153	0.465	0.972	FALSE
CNN Attitudes	If people spent some time watching CNN, they would realize it isn't as bad as they think.	Media Attitudes	-0.149	0.087	0.087	0.211	0.925	TRUE
Covered Issue Attitudes	INDEX: Liberal Preferences on Covered Issues		0.067	0.037	0.071	0.105	NA	NA
Covered Issue Attitudes	States should allow voters to vote by mail in the 2020 election.	Issue Attitudes	0.238	0.062	0.000	0.012	0.056	FALSE

Table OA9: Effect on Midline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
Covered Issue Attitudes	(-) Allowing so many people to vote by mail will inevitably lead to widespread fraud in the elections.	Issue Attitudes	0.184	0.057	0.001	0.024	0.152	FALSE
Covered Issue Attitudes	(-) The government should refuse to do business with companies that teach their employees that America is a racist and sexist country.	Issue Attitudes	0.178	0.071	0.013	0.113	0.441	FALSE
Covered Issue Attitudes	I support the recent protests against police (for example, "Black Lives Matter").	Issue Attitudes	0.122	0.062	0.050	0.310	0.730	FALSE
Covered Issue Attitudes	I plan to vote by mail this year.	Issue Attitudes	0.113	0.065	0.083	0.365	0.832	FALSE
Covered Issue Attitudes	(-) Police should use force against protestors who refuse to comply with police orders.	Issue Attitudes	0.010	0.062	0.874	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Covered Issue Attitudes	Congress should do more to address global warming (also known as climate change).	Issue Attitudes	-0.002	0.057	0.971	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Covered Issue Attitudes	Global warming is happening.	Issue Attitudes	-0.118	0.082	0.150	0.465	0.898	FALSE
Covered Issue Attitudes	Schools and companies should teach people about racism in the United States.	Issue Attitudes	-0.148	0.097	0.128	0.447	0.898	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	INDEX: COVID Attitudes		0.062	0.027	0.020	0.059	NA	NA
COVID Attitudes	The coronavirus causes many people to experience serious long-term health problems that stay with them for months or longer.	COVID Attitudes	0.183	0.060	0.002	0.040	0.137	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	The government should be doing more to stop the spread of coronavirus.	COVID Attitudes	0.164	0.080	0.042	0.292	0.607	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	Many other countries have done a much better job of controlling the coronavirus than the United States government.	COVID Attitudes	0.163	0.062	0.008	0.078	0.268	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	Donald Trump should probably take the coronavirus pandemic more seriously.	COVID Attitudes	0.110	0.056	0.050	0.310	0.607	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	The government could have done more early this year to stop the coronavirus from ever spreading so widely in the United States.	COVID Attitudes	0.106	0.059	0.072	0.365	0.672	FALSE

Table OA9: Effect on Midline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
COVID Attitudes	(-) The number of Americans with coronavirus has been falling quickly.	COVID Attitudes	0.103	0.065	0.117	0.419	0.768	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	I'm concerned that people I care about are going to catch the coronavirus.	COVID Attitudes	0.101	0.055	0.065	0.360	0.662	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	(-) Schools should be open for in-person classes right now.	COVID Attitudes	0.063	0.053	0.240	0.566	0.928	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	The coronavirus is still infecting huge numbers of Americans every day.	COVID Attitudes	0.055	0.065	0.396	0.774	0.981	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	(-) The coronavirus is not as dangerous as many people seem to think.	COVID Attitudes	0.039	0.052	0.453	0.781	0.984	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	Because of the risk of spreading coronavirus, Donald Trump and Joe Biden should not be holding campaign rallies.	COVID Attitudes	0.036	0.073	0.617	0.970	0.996	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	Everyone in a grocery store should wear a mask.	COVID Attitudes	0.018	0.050	0.712	1.000	0.996	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	(-) Wearing a mask is useless.	COVID Attitudes	0.005	0.046	0.921	1.000	1.000	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	(-) Any remaining coronavirus restrictions on businesses such as restaurants, bars, and movie theaters should be removed; the rules for these businesses should all go back to normal.	COVID Attitudes	0.000	0.054	0.994	1.000	1.000	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	The sickness and death the coronavirus pandemic has caused in America is one of the greatest tragedies in American history.	COVID Attitudes	-0.010	0.099	0.921	1.000	1.000	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	I'm concerned that Donald Trump will order the government to approve a coronavirus vaccine before scientists are sure that it's safe and that it works.	COVID Attitudes	-0.103	0.059	0.082	0.365	0.688	FALSE
During-Treatment Fox News Viewership	INDEX: Self-reported Reduced During-Treatment Fox News Viewership		0.080	0.045	0.077	0.105	NA	NA
During-Treatment Fox News Viewership	(-) During-Treatment Viewership of Fox Shows During Incentivized Hours	During-Treatment Viewership	0.151	0.051	0.003	0.015	0.011	TRUE
During-Treatment Fox News Viewership	(-) Fox Min Watched Per Week During Treatment Period	During-Treatment Viewership	-0.021	0.058	0.720	0.331	0.724	TRUE
Fox Attitudes	INDEX: Unfavorable Fox Attitudes		0.087	0.036	0.015	0.055	NA	NA

Table OA9: Effect on Midline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
Fox Attitudes	(-) If Donald Trump did something bad, Fox News would discuss it.	Media Attitudes	0.200	0.061	0.001	0.024	0.145	FALSE
Fox Attitudes	Fox News only covers news stories that help Republicans.	Media Attitudes	0.169	0.097	0.084	0.365	0.925	FALSE
Fox Attitudes	(-) When covering important news stories, Fox News tells the whole story.	Media Attitudes	0.115	0.059	0.052	0.311	0.842	FALSE
Fox Attitudes	(-) Feeling therm: Fox News	Media Attitudes	0.109	0.053	0.041	0.292	0.790	FALSE
Fox Attitudes	(-) Trust Fox News	Media Attitudes	0.065	0.055	0.231	0.278	0.988	TRUE
Fox Attitudes	(-) Fox News is good for society.	Media Attitudes	0.005	0.056	0.926	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Fox Attitudes	Ideological distance from self: Fox News	Media Attitudes	-0.029	0.078	0.712	1.000	1.000	FALSE
General Media Attitudes	INDEX: General Media Attitudes		-0.009	0.030	0.775	0.450	NA	NA
General Media Attitudes	(-) If a journalist accuses a Republican politician of misconduct without naming their sources, the journalist should be criminally investigated.	Media Attitudes	0.111	0.060	0.067	0.360	0.890	FALSE
General Media Attitudes	Journalists must always be free to criticize our political leaders.	Media Attitudes	0.033	0.067	0.625	0.970	1.000	FALSE
General Media Attitudes	(-) When they criticize political leaders, news organizations prevent political leaders from doing their jobs.	Media Attitudes	-0.013	0.064	0.844	1.000	1.000	FALSE
General Media Attitudes	Feeling therm: Journalists	Media Attitudes	-0.035	0.058	0.542	0.919	1.000	FALSE
General Media Attitudes	(-) Ideological distance from self: The Media in General	Media Attitudes	-0.055	0.079	0.488	0.819	1.000	FALSE
General Media Attitudes	Trust the media in general	Media Attitudes	-0.065	0.062	0.296	0.286	0.995	TRUE
General Political Preferences	INDEX: Democratic-Leaning General Political Preferences		0.055	0.026	0.038	0.071	NA	NA
General Political Preferences	(-) Feeling therm: Republican party candidates and elected officials	Partisan Attitudes	0.177	0.049	0.000	0.015	0.040	FALSE
General Political Preferences	2020 Presidential Election Vote Choice	Partisan Attitudes	0.068	0.042	0.107	0.401	0.911	FALSE
General Political Preferences	Party Identification	Partisan Attitudes	0.018	0.040	0.645	0.980	1.000	FALSE
General Political Preferences	Feeling therm: Democratic party candidates and elected officials	Partisan Attitudes	0.010	0.057	0.866	1.000	1.000	FALSE
General Political Preferences	(-) Ideological placement: Yourself	Partisan Attitudes	0.000	0.046	0.992	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Non-Covered Issue Attitudes	INDEX: Liberal Preferences on Non-Covered Issues		0.035	0.050	0.482	0.366	NA	NA

Table OA9: Effect on Midline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
Non-Covered Issue Attitudes	(-) Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient.	Issue Attitudes	0.071	0.093	0.447	0.781	0.992	FALSE
Non-Covered Issue Attitudes	The government should do much more to help the needy.	Issue Attitudes	0.058	0.088	0.506	0.848	0.992	FALSE
Non-Covered Issue Attitudes	Free trade agreements between the US and other countries have been a good thing.	Issue Attitudes	0.009	0.107	0.935	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Non-Covered Issue Attitudes	Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents.	Issue Attitudes	0.003	0.101	0.975	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Norms	INDEX: Support for Democratic Norms		0.018	0.044	0.690	0.429	NA	NA
Norms	(-) If a Republican governor of a state can't get cooperation from Democratic legislators to pass new laws, the Republican governor should issue executive orders on their own to accomplish their priorities.	Norms	0.070	0.065	0.278	0.624	0.462	FALSE
Norms	When possible, Republican politicians should try to compromise with Democratic politicians to get things done.	Norms	-0.066	0.060	0.269	0.619	0.462	FALSE
Racial Prejudice	INDEX: Reduced Racial Prejudice		0.028	0.029	0.348	0.291	NA	NA
Racial Prejudice	Feeling therm: The Black Lives Matter movement	Racial Prejudice	0.113	0.064	0.078	0.211	0.436	TRUE
Racial Prejudice	Racial resentment: Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.	Racial Prejudice	0.090	0.055	0.102	0.401	0.471	FALSE
Racial Prejudice	(-) Color-blind racial attitudes: Racial problems in the US are rare, isolated situations.	Racial Prejudice	0.029	0.060	0.633	0.972	0.981	FALSE
Racial Prejudice	Color-blind racial attitudes: White people in the US have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.	Racial Prejudice	0.002	0.054	0.974	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Racial Prejudice	Feeling therm: Blacks	Racial Prejudice	0.000	0.063	0.996	1.000	1.000	FALSE

Table OA9: Effect on Midline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
Racial Prejudice	(-) Racial resentment: Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.	Racial Prejudice	-0.008	0.059	0.891	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Racial Prejudice	(-) Racial resentment: It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.	Racial Prejudice	-0.045	0.055	0.412	0.776	0.921	FALSE
Second Order Beliefs	INDEX: Second Order Beliefs about Liberalism of Average American		-0.017	0.048	0.720	0.429	NA	NA
Second Order Beliefs	(-) Expected Trump Vote Share in 2020 Presidential Election	Partisan Attitudes	0.066	0.062	0.284	0.631	0.993	FALSE
Second Order Beliefs	(-) Ideological placement: The Average American	Partisan Attitudes	-0.090	0.064	0.158	0.465	0.952	FALSE
Substitute news source use	INDEX: Self-reported Substitute News Source Use		-0.083	0.040	0.038	0.071	NA	NA
Substitute news source use	cnn.com use during treatment period	Substitute news source use	0.137	0.069	0.048	0.310	0.482	FALSE
Substitute news source use	Local TV use during treatment period	Substitute news source use	0.028	0.069	0.687	1.000	0.978	FALSE
Substitute news source use	foxnews.com use during treatment period	Substitute news source use	0.027	0.073	0.713	1.000	0.978	FALSE
Substitute news source use	Local newspaper use during treatment period	Substitute news source use	-0.020	0.109	0.855	1.000	0.978	FALSE
Substitute news source use	Breitbart use during treatment period	Substitute news source use	-0.045	0.065	0.488	0.819	0.963	FALSE
Substitute news source use	News discussions with friends and family during treatment period	Substitute news source use	-0.053	0.069	0.450	0.781	0.963	FALSE
Substitute news source use	Twitter use during treatment period	Substitute news source use	-0.114	0.102	0.264	0.617	0.901	FALSE
Substitute news source use	Radio news use during treatment period	Substitute news source use	-0.124	0.069	0.073	0.365	0.568	FALSE
Substitute news source use	One America News use during treatment period	Substitute news source use	-0.161	0.071	0.024	0.199	0.415	FALSE

Table OA9: Effect on Midline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
Substitute news source use	Facebook use during treatment period	Substitute news source use	-0.222	0.102	0.030	0.219	0.444	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	INDEX: Reduced Trump Evaluation		0.096	0.029	0.001	0.013	NA	NA
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trump evaluation: Encouraging Americans to stay safe from and not spread the coronavirus	Partisan Attitudes	0.209	0.059	0.000	0.015	0.044	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	Trait rating: Trump selfish	Partisan Attitudes	0.190	0.059	0.001	0.026	0.093	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trump evaluation: Ensuring the election is fair and that people trust the results	Partisan Attitudes	0.177	0.064	0.006	0.063	0.220	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trump evaluation: Encouraging good relationships between different racial groups in the US	Partisan Attitudes	0.166	0.056	0.003	0.044	0.159	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trait rating: Trump patriotic	Partisan Attitudes	0.144	0.059	0.014	0.116	0.397	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Feeling therm: President Donald Trump	Partisan Attitudes	0.144	0.042	0.001	0.018	0.055	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trait rating: Trump intelligent	Partisan Attitudes	0.100	0.057	0.078	0.365	0.860	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trump evaluation: Managing the coronavirus pandemic	Partisan Attitudes	0.099	0.056	0.076	0.365	0.860	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trump evaluation: The environment and climate change	Partisan Attitudes	0.094	0.093	0.314	0.684	0.995	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trait rating: Trump honest	Partisan Attitudes	0.086	0.054	0.112	0.406	0.911	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	Ideological distance from self: President Donald Trump	Partisan Attitudes	0.051	0.064	0.423	0.781	0.997	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trump evaluation: Managing the economy	Partisan Attitudes	0.024	0.064	0.712	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	Trait rating: Trump mean	Partisan Attitudes	-0.001	0.059	0.982	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trump evaluation: Respecting the military	Partisan Attitudes	-0.001	0.087	0.987	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trump evaluation: Ensuring America does not get drawn into any unnecessary wars	Partisan Attitudes	-0.059	0.064	0.361	0.719	0.996	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trump evaluation: Overseeing the development of a vaccine for the coronavirus	Partisan Attitudes	-0.060	0.064	0.354	0.710	0.996	FALSE

Table OA9: Effect on Midline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
Trump Position Perceptions - CNN-Covered	INDEX: Increased Knowledge of CNN-Covered Trump Positions		0.083	0.026	0.002	0.014	NA	NA
Trump Position Perceptions - CNN-Covered	(-) T/F: Trump said that he would accept the results of the election if he is declared the loser.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.250	0.102	0.014	0.116	0.794	FALSE
Trump Position Perceptions - CNN-Covered	(-) Trump supports: Americans should wear masks in public.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.228	0.068	0.001	0.023	0.325	FALSE
Trump Position Perceptions - CNN-Covered	T/F: Back in February, Donald Trump admitted privately that he knew the coronavirus was much more deadly than the flu.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.120	0.101	0.235	0.566	0.999	FALSE
Trump Position Perceptions - CNN-Covered	T/F: President Donald Trump referred to US soldiers who died in combat and are buried at the Aisne-Marne cemetery as ”losers” and ”suckers.”	Perceptions of Current Events	0.109	0.091	0.232	0.566	0.999	FALSE
Trump Position Perceptions - CNN-Covered	Trump supports: Open America’s public schools for in-person classes this fall.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.079	0.092	0.388	0.758	0.999	FALSE
Trump Position Perceptions - CNN-Covered	(-) Trump supports: Increase taxes on corporations and wealthy people.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.073	0.100	0.467	0.795	0.999	FALSE
Trump Position Perceptions - CNN-Covered	(-) Trump supports: All Americans should be allowed to vote by mail.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.011	0.078	0.890	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Trump Position Perceptions - CNN-Covered	Trump supports: Repeal the law that prohibits insurance companies from charging people more if they have pre-existing medical conditions.	Perceptions of Current Events	-0.024	0.106	0.819	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Trump Position Perceptions - Fox-Covered	INDEX: Reduced Knowledge of Fox-Covered Trump Positions		-0.019	0.049	0.701	0.429	NA	NA
Trump Position Perceptions - Fox-Covered	(-) T/F: Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain recently signed a Middle East peace deal at the White House.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.070	0.092	0.446	0.781	0.999	FALSE
Trump Position Perceptions - Fox-Covered	(-) T/F: Donald Trump recently banned diversity trainings for government staff that incorporate teachings about ”critical race theory” and ”white privilege”.	Perceptions of Current Events	-0.075	0.095	0.430	0.781	0.999	FALSE

11.2.1 Additional Midline Figures

For all Figures in this section, standard errors (thick lines) and 95% confidence intervals (thin) surround point estimates. See Table OA9 for numerical estimates. q is the FDR sharpened q-value (Anderson, 2008) and p_{wy} is the FWER adjusted p-value (Westfall and Young, 1993).

Figure OA4: Effects on Issue Importance and Agenda Setting



Figure OA5: Liberal Perceptions of Events CNN Covered (Non-COVID) Index



Figure OA6: COVID Attitudes Index



Figure OA7: Reduced Knowledge of Fox-Covered Biden 'Positions' Index



Figure OA8: Reduced Knowledge of Fox-Covered Trump Positions Index



Figure OA9: Increased Knowledge of CNN-Covered Biden Positions Index



Figure OA10: Increased Knowledge of CNN-Covered Trump Positions Index



Figure OA11: Liberal Preferences on Covered Issues Index



Figure OA12: Reduced Ethnic Antagonism Index



Figure OA13: Reduced Racial Prejudice Index



Figure OA14: Democratic-Leaning General Political Preferences Index



Figure OA15: Biden Evaluation Index



Figure OA16: Favorable CNN Attitudes Index



11.3 Endline Survey Results

The below table presents the results on the endline survey.

Table OA10: Effect on Endline Survey

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
-	Discuss politics with friends and family	-	0.227	0.098	0.021	1.000	NA	FALSE
-	Hrs of CNN Watched Yesterday	Post-Treatment Viewership	0.208	0.072	0.004	0.048	0.087	TRUE
-	Fox Would Cover: Biden planning tax increases	-	0.197	0.094	0.037	1.000	NA	FALSE
-	CNN Min Watched Per Week During Last Week	Post-Treatment Viewership	0.171	0.074	0.021	0.119	0.196	TRUE
-	Fauci approval	-	0.150	0.090	0.096	1.000	NA	FALSE
-	Try to persuade someone about politics	-	0.135	0.109	0.214	1.000	NA	FALSE
-	Fox Would Cover: Harris encouraging BLM violence	-	0.124	0.103	0.233	1.000	NA	FALSE
-	Attend a rally or campaign event	-	0.096	0.102	0.348	1.000	NA	FALSE
-	Express political views on social media	-	0.075	0.103	0.462	1.000	NA	FALSE
-	(-) Post-Treatment Viewership of Fox Shows Not During Incentivized Hours	During-Treatment Viewership	0.071	0.059	0.233	1.000	0.238	FALSE
-	Work or volunteer for a campaign	-	0.052	0.105	0.619	1.000	NA	FALSE
-	Display a poster, bumper-sticker, or button	-	0.050	0.104	0.631	1.000	NA	FALSE
-	Hrs of MSNBC Watched Yesterday	-	0.040	0.065	0.543	1.000	NA	FALSE
-	Donate money to a political cause	-	0.037	0.106	0.728	1.000	NA	FALSE
-	MSNBC Min Watched Per Week During Last Week	-	0.035	0.101	0.729	1.000	NA	FALSE
-	Ideological distance from self: MSNBC	Exploratory Outcomes	0.030	0.035	0.396	1.000	0.785	FALSE
-	Issue importance: The economy	Agenda Setting	0.010	0.098	0.916	1.000	0.996	FALSE
-	(-) Payment required to watch an hour of CNN	Media Attitudes	0.010	0.108	0.927	1.000	1.000	TRUE
-	Feeling therm: New York Times	Media Attitudes	0.007	0.061	0.915	1.000	1.000	FALSE
-	Feeling therm: Muslims	Exploratory Outcomes	-0.009	0.056	0.874	1.000	0.970	FALSE
-	Feeling therm: Hispanics	Exploratory Outcomes	-0.013	0.064	0.834	1.000	0.970	FALSE
-	Feeling therm: Asians	Exploratory Outcomes	-0.058	0.064	0.368	1.000	0.785	FALSE
-	(-) Hrs of Fox Watched Yesterday	Post-Treatment Viewership	-0.061	0.067	0.360	0.660	0.790	TRUE

Table OA10: Effect on Endline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
-	Feeling therm: Whites	Exploratory Outcomes	-0.067	0.065	0.305	1.000	0.754	FALSE
-	Feeling therm: Illegal Immigrants	Exploratory Outcomes	-0.085	0.061	0.167	1.000	0.591	FALSE
-	Be an active member of a political group	-	-0.111	0.118	0.346	1.000	NA	FALSE
-	Attend a protest	-	-0.170	0.112	0.131	1.000	NA	FALSE
-	Contact an elected official	-	-0.182	0.115	0.114	1.000	NA	FALSE
Affect towards Democratic voters	INDEX: Affect towards Democratic voters		0.030	0.038	0.437	1.000	NA	NA
Affect towards Democratic voters	(-) Ideological distance from self: The Average Person who Votes for Democrats	Polarization	0.051	0.041	0.208	1.000	0.911	FALSE
Affect towards Democratic voters	Feeling therm: Democratic party voters	Polarization	0.024	0.060	0.683	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Affect towards Republican voters	INDEX: Reduced Affect towards Republican voters		0.022	0.048	0.649	1.000	NA	NA
Affect towards Republican voters	(-) Feeling therm: Republican party voters	Polarization	0.023	0.057	0.687	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Affect towards Republican voters	Ideological distance from self: The Average Person who Votes for Republicans	Polarization	-0.011	0.070	0.874	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Agenda Setting	INDEX: CNN (vs. Fox)-Consistent Issue Importance		-0.020	0.040	0.611	1.000	NA	NA
Agenda Setting	(-) Violent protests are more important than COVID for President to focus on.	Agenda Setting	0.105	0.067	0.120	0.372	0.824	TRUE
Agenda Setting	Issue importance: The coronavirus pandemic	Agenda Setting	0.030	0.059	0.611	1.000	0.996	FALSE
Agenda Setting	(-) Issue importance: Danger to America from socialism	Agenda Setting	0.026	0.092	0.779	1.000	0.996	FALSE
Agenda Setting	Issue importance: Healthcare	Agenda Setting	0.006	0.063	0.919	1.000	0.996	FALSE
Agenda Setting	(-) Issue importance: Violence in American cities	Agenda Setting	-0.036	0.071	0.612	1.000	0.996	FALSE
Agenda Setting	Issue importance: The environment and climate change	Agenda Setting	-0.043	0.061	0.481	1.000	0.990	FALSE
Agenda Setting	(-) Issue importance: The risk of fraud in the elections	Agenda Setting	-0.061	0.063	0.332	1.000	0.965	FALSE

Table OA10: Effect on Endline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
Agenda Setting	(-) Issue importance: Danger to American values from people with extreme views on race	Agenda Setting	-0.140	0.109	0.202	1.000	0.916	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events CNN Covered	INDEX: Liberal Perceptions of Events CNN Covered (Non-COVID)		-0.014	0.036	0.702	1.000	NA	NA
Attitudes Towards Events CNN Covered	T/F: Russian President Vladimir Putin has been interfering in this year's Presidential election to help Donald Trump.	Attitudes Towards Events	0.130	0.098	0.185	1.000	0.984	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events CNN Covered	(-) T/F: Donald Trump's campaign is taking significant safety precautions at its rallies to reduce the risk that rally attendees spread the coronavirus to each other.	Attitudes Towards Events	0.123	0.068	0.071	1.000	0.898	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events CNN Covered	T/F: The Department of Homeland Security recently warned that the Russian government is trying to undermine confidence in the 2020 election by promoting claims that mail-in voting encourages fraud.	Attitudes Towards Events	0.102	0.113	0.368	1.000	0.997	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events CNN Covered	T/F: Over 200,000 Americans have died from COVID-19.	Attitudes Towards Events	0.016	0.068	0.811	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events CNN Covered	Climate change probably played a role in the recent wildfires on the West Coast.	Attitudes Towards Events	-0.010	0.062	0.866	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events CNN Covered	T/F: Donald Trump only paid $750 in federal income taxes the year he won the presidency.	Attitudes Towards Events	-0.012	0.074	0.867	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events CNN Covered	(-) If Donald Trump is declared the loser of the election, he will accept the results.	Attitudes Towards Events	-0.126	0.068	0.064	1.000	0.885	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	INDEX: Liberal Perceptions of Events Fox Covered (Non-COVID)		0.058	0.031	0.061	0.819	NA	NA
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) I think many Biden supporters are probably happy to see it when police officers get shot.	Attitudes Towards Events	0.195	0.065	0.003	0.761	0.265	FALSE

Table OA10: Effect on Endline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) What Joe Biden has been saying about the ongoing protests has only made the protests more violent.	Attitudes Towards Events	0.136	0.092	0.141	1.000	0.974	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) If I were walking down the street in New York City or Portland right now, it would probably feel like being in a war zone.	Attitudes Towards Events	0.112	0.064	0.081	1.000	0.911	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) If Joe Biden is elected President, we'll see many more police get shot by Black Lives Matter activists.	Attitudes Towards Events	0.101	0.091	0.264	1.000	0.993	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) If Joe Biden is elected President, the protests in America's cities will only get more violent.	Attitudes Towards Events	0.066	0.068	0.332	1.000	0.996	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) T/F: There is much more violent crime in big cities in America than there used to be.	Attitudes Towards Events	0.046	0.073	0.525	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) Democrats are trying to steal the election with fraudulent mail-in ballots.	Attitudes Towards Events	0.040	0.055	0.465	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) If elected president, Joe Biden will do whatever it is that radical left socialists like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Bernie Sanders tell him to do.	Attitudes Towards Events	0.038	0.063	0.547	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) The Democratic Party's views on race are so extreme, even most black people think they are harmful.	Attitudes Towards Events	0.023	0.066	0.730	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) T/F: Billionaires have been paying to bail rioters out of jail so they can get back on the streets and continue rioting.	Attitudes Towards Events	0.023	0.097	0.816	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) Recent calls to "defund the police" have led to increases in violent crime in American cities.	Attitudes Towards Events	-0.005	0.095	0.961	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Events Fox Covered	(-) Blacks are treated just as fairly as whites when dealing with the police.	Attitudes Towards Events	-0.023	0.063	0.713	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events	INDEX: Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events		0.020	0.051	0.697	1.000	NA	NA

Table OA10: Effect on Endline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events	(-) Many of the votes that were cast in the 2020 presidential election should not be counted.	Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events	0.085	0.096	0.377	1.000	0.994	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events	(-) If we threw out the fraudulent votes, Donald Trump would have been declared the winner of the 2020 election.	Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events	0.076	0.059	0.198	1.000	0.965	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events	(-) Big technology companies, such as Facebook and Twitter, are biased against Republicans and conservatives.	Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events	0.070	0.096	0.468	1.000	0.994	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events	(-) There was widespread fraud in the 2020 presidential election.	Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events	0.047	0.058	0.418	1.000	0.994	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events	(-) The Trump campaign should keep asking questions about whether there was widespread fraud in the election.	Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events	0.033	0.092	0.720	1.000	0.995	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events	(-) Joe Biden's son Hunter Biden is seriously corrupt.	Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events	0.017	0.095	0.860	1.000	0.995	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events	Donald Trump should admit he lost the 2020 presidential election.	Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events	-0.009	0.057	0.879	1.000	0.995	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events	(-) I am worried that illegal votes are being counted in the 2020 presidential election.	Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events	-0.023	0.053	0.669	1.000	0.995	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events	Locking down communities keeps people safe from coronavirus	Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events	-0.068	0.060	0.257	1.000	0.981	FALSE
Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events	(-) Biden supports: National coronavirus lockdown	Attitudes Towards Post-Incentivized Period Events	-0.072	0.101	0.477	1.000	0.994	FALSE
Biden Evaluation	INDEX: Biden Evaluation		0.088	0.039	0.023	0.356	NA	NA
Biden Evaluation	Trait rating: Biden honest	Partisan Attitudes	0.125	0.062	0.047	1.000	0.814	FALSE
Biden Evaluation	(-) Trait rating: Biden mean	Partisan Attitudes	0.123	0.065	0.061	1.000	0.871	FALSE
Biden Evaluation	Feeling therm: Former Vice President Joe Biden	Partisan Attitudes	0.088	0.060	0.142	1.000	0.982	FALSE

Table OA10: Effect on Endline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
Biden Evaluation	(-) Trait rating: Biden selfish	Partisan Attitudes	0.073	0.067	0.279	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Biden Evaluation	Trait rating: Biden patriotic	Partisan Attitudes	0.068	0.063	0.281	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Biden Evaluation	Trait rating: Biden intelligent	Partisan Attitudes	0.065	0.065	0.316	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Biden Evaluation	(-) Ideological distance from self: Former Vice President Joe Biden	Partisan Attitudes	0.062	0.041	0.131	1.000	0.980	FALSE
Biden Position Perception - CNN-Covered	INDEX: Increased Knowledge of CNN-Covered Biden Positions		-0.040	0.065	0.532	1.000	NA	NA
Biden Position Perception - CNN-Covered	Biden supports: Increase taxes on corporations and wealthy people.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.009	0.062	0.882	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Biden Position Perception - CNN-Covered	T/F: A large number of former military leaders and former Republican leaders have endorsed Joe Biden for President.	Perceptions of Current Events	-0.103	0.110	0.350	1.000	0.989	FALSE
Biden Position Perception - CNN-Covered	Biden supports: Create a new government insurance option like Medicare, allowing Americans to keep their private insurance if they want, but also allowing them to choose to have government health insurance if they want it instead.	Perceptions of Current Events	-0.111	0.110	0.312	1.000	0.989	FALSE
Biden Position Perception - Fox-Covered	INDEX: Reduced Knowledge of Fox-Covered Biden "Positions"		0.048	0.038	0.204	1.000	NA	NA
Biden Position Perception - Fox-Covered	T/F: Joe Biden has condemned violence at recent Black Lives Matter protests.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.179	0.070	0.011	1.000	0.465	FALSE
Biden Position Perception - Fox-Covered	(-) Biden supports: Tear down statues of anyone who owned slaves, including George Washington.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.052	0.066	0.429	1.000	0.989	FALSE
Biden Position Perception - Fox-Covered	(-) Biden supports: Eliminate all funding for the police.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.042	0.061	0.492	1.000	0.989	FALSE
Biden Position Perception - Fox-Covered	(-) Biden supports: Substantially increase government spending by trillions of dollars over the next decade.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.025	0.069	0.712	1.000	0.995	FALSE
Biden Position Perception - Fox-Covered	(-) Biden supports: Racial minorities should receive special treatment in hiring and college admissions to make up for past discrimination.	Perceptions of Current Events	-0.162	0.103	0.115	1.000	0.938	FALSE
CNN Attitudes	INDEX: Favorable CNN Attitudes		0.033	0.041	0.415	1.000	NA	NA

Table OA10: Effect on Endline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
CNN Attitudes	Trust CNN	Media Attitudes	0.104	0.060	0.082	0.328	0.932	TRUE
CNN Attitudes	Feeling therm: CNN	Media Attitudes	0.071	0.057	0.214	1.000	0.994	FALSE
CNN Attitudes	(-) Ideological distance from self: CNN	Media Attitudes	-0.060	0.035	0.084	1.000	0.932	FALSE
Covered Issue Attitudes	INDEX: Liberal Preferences on Covered Issues		0.030	0.029	0.303	1.000	NA	NA
Covered Issue Attitudes	I support the recent protests against police (for example, "Black Lives Matter").	Issue Attitudes	0.097	0.064	0.131	1.000	0.702	FALSE
Covered Issue Attitudes	(-) The government should refuse to do business with companies that teach their employees that America is a racist and sexist country.	Issue Attitudes	0.086	0.072	0.232	1.000	0.872	FALSE
Covered Issue Attitudes	Schools and companies should teach people about racism in the United States.	Issue Attitudes	0.057	0.070	0.420	1.000	0.961	FALSE
Covered Issue Attitudes	Congress should do more to address global warming (also known as climate change).	Issue Attitudes	0.017	0.054	0.749	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Covered Issue Attitudes	States should allow voters to vote by mail in the 2020 election.	Issue Attitudes	0.017	0.065	0.795	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Covered Issue Attitudes	(-) Allowing so many people to vote by mail will inevitably lead to widespread fraud in the elections.	Issue Attitudes	0.007	0.060	0.906	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Covered Issue Attitudes	I plan to vote by mail this year.	Issue Attitudes	0.006	0.060	0.916	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Covered Issue Attitudes	(-) Police should use force against protestors who refuse to comply with police orders.	Issue Attitudes	0.000	0.069	0.996	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Covered Issue Attitudes	Global warming is happening.	Issue Attitudes	-0.062	0.061	0.309	1.000	0.921	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	INDEX: COVID Attitudes		-0.015	0.028	0.596	1.000	NA	NA
COVID Attitudes	(-) The number of Americans with coronavirus has been falling quickly.	COVID Attitudes	0.082	0.069	0.233	1.000	0.972	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	The coronavirus causes many people to experience serious long-term health problems that stay with them for months or longer.	COVID Attitudes	0.062	0.067	0.356	1.000	0.989	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	Donald Trump should probably take the coronavirus pandemic more seriously.	COVID Attitudes	0.041	0.056	0.467	1.000	0.995	FALSE

Table OA10: Effect on Endline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
COVID Attitudes	I'm concerned that people I care about are going to catch the coronavirus.	COVID Attitudes	0.029	0.057	0.613	1.000	0.999	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	(-) Wearing a mask is useless.	COVID Attitudes	0.015	0.048	0.760	1.000	0.999	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	The coronavirus is still infecting huge numbers of Americans every day.	COVID Attitudes	0.013	0.062	0.828	1.000	0.999	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	Because of the risk of spreading coronavirus, Donald Trump and Joe Biden should not be holding campaign rallies.	COVID Attitudes	0.006	0.056	0.909	1.000	0.999	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	Many other countries have done a much better job of controlling the coronavirus than the United States government.	COVID Attitudes	0.000	0.061	0.995	1.000	0.999	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	Everyone in a grocery store should wear a mask.	COVID Attitudes	-0.018	0.051	0.724	1.000	0.999	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	The government could have done more early this year to stop the coronavirus from ever spreading so widely in the United States.	COVID Attitudes	-0.024	0.060	0.693	1.000	0.999	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	(-) Schools should be open for in-person classes right now.	COVID Attitudes	-0.044	0.056	0.427	1.000	0.995	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	(-) Any remaining coronavirus restrictions on businesses such as restaurants, bars, and movie theaters should be removed; the rules for these businesses should all go back to normal.	COVID Attitudes	-0.047	0.060	0.432	1.000	0.995	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	(-) The coronavirus is not as dangerous as many people seem to think.	COVID Attitudes	-0.057	0.057	0.314	1.000	0.987	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	The government should be doing more to stop the spread of coronavirus.	COVID Attitudes	-0.063	0.058	0.278	1.000	0.984	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	The sickness and death the coronavirus pandemic has caused in America is one of the greatest tragedies in American history.	COVID Attitudes	-0.064	0.062	0.299	1.000	0.987	FALSE
COVID Attitudes	I'm concerned that Donald Trump will order the government to approve a coronavirus vaccine before scientists are sure that it's safe and that it works.	COVID Attitudes	-0.091	0.059	0.124	1.000	0.856	FALSE

Table OA10: Effect on Endline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
Fox Attitudes	INDEX: Unfavorable Fox Attitudes		0.052	0.041	0.197	1.000	NA	NA
Fox Attitudes	(-) When covering important news stories, Fox News tells the whole story.	Media Attitudes	0.144	0.068	0.034	1.000	0.776	FALSE
Fox Attitudes	(-) Trust Fox News	Media Attitudes	0.051	0.060	0.397	0.660	0.999	TRUE
Fox Attitudes	Fox News only covers news stories that help Republicans.	Media Attitudes	0.047	0.068	0.486	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Fox Attitudes	(-) Fox News is good for society.	Media Attitudes	0.037	0.063	0.557	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Fox Attitudes	(-) If Donald Trump did something bad, Fox News would discuss it.	Media Attitudes	0.030	0.102	0.766	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Fox Attitudes	(-) Feeling therm: Fox News	Media Attitudes	0.029	0.059	0.622	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Fox Attitudes	Ideological distance from self: Fox News	Media Attitudes	0.022	0.096	0.821	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Fox Coverage Filtering Perceptions	INDEX: Fox Coverage Filtering Perceptions		0.049	0.073	0.505	1.000	NA	NA
Fox Coverage Filtering Perceptions	(-) Fox Would Cover: Trump golfing rather than working	Media Attitudes	0.142	0.093	0.125	1.000	0.972	FALSE
Fox Coverage Filtering Perceptions	(-) Fox Would Cover: Trump encouraging Americans sick with COVID to attend Thanksgiving dinner	Media Attitudes	0.096	0.100	0.337	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Fox Coverage Filtering Perceptions	(-) Fox Would Cover: Trump spending government money at his hotels	Media Attitudes	0.070	0.067	0.296	1.000	0.998	FALSE
Fox Coverage Filtering Perceptions	(-) Fox Would Cover: Trump misleading American people	Media Attitudes	0.034	0.093	0.716	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Fox Coverage Filtering Perceptions	(-) Fox Would Cover: Trump not sending vaccines to Biden areas	Media Attitudes	-0.047	0.096	0.626	1.000	1.000	FALSE
General Media Attitudes	INDEX: General Media Attitudes		0.011	0.035	0.750	1.000	NA	NA
General Media Attitudes	(-) If a journalist accuses a Republican politician of misconduct without naming their sources, the journalist should be criminally investigated.	Media Attitudes	0.052	0.062	0.401	1.000	0.999	FALSE
General Media Attitudes	Feeling therm: Journalists	Media Attitudes	0.016	0.056	0.775	1.000	1.000	FALSE
General Media Attitudes	(-) Ideological distance from self: The Media in General	Media Attitudes	-0.016	0.038	0.677	1.000	1.000	FALSE
General Media Attitudes	Trust the media in general	Media Attitudes	-0.071	0.061	0.247	0.529	0.996	TRUE
General Political Preferences	INDEX: Democratic-Leaning General Political Preferences		0.040	0.027	0.142	1.000	NA	NA

Table OA10: Effect on Endline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
General Political Preferences	(-) Feeling therm: Republican party candidates and elected officials	Partisan Attitudes	0.096	0.059	0.103	1.000	0.956	FALSE
General Political Preferences	Feeling therm: Democratic party candidates and elected officials	Partisan Attitudes	0.042	0.056	0.452	1.000	0.999	FALSE
General Political Preferences	2020 Presidential Election Vote Choice	Partisan Attitudes	0.041	0.041	0.325	1.000	0.999	FALSE
General Political Preferences	(-) Ideological placement: Yourself	Partisan Attitudes	-0.008	0.046	0.864	1.000	1.000	FALSE
General Political Preferences	Party Identification	Partisan Attitudes	-0.029	0.045	0.517	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Huddy Partisan Identity	INDEX: Partisan Identity		0.016	0.042	0.699	1.000	NA	NA
Huddy Partisan Identity	(-) Partisan Identity: Republican party is my party	Polarization	0.048	0.062	0.441	1.000	0.990	FALSE
Huddy Partisan Identity	(-) Partisan Identity: We vs. They	Polarization	0.048	0.063	0.447	1.000	0.990	FALSE
Huddy Partisan Identity	(-) Partisan Identity: Praise makes me feel good	Polarization	0.014	0.063	0.818	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Huddy Partisan Identity	(-) Partisan Identity: Criticism is a personal insult	Polarization	0.008	0.093	0.933	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Huddy Partisan Identity	(-) Partisan Identity: Feel connected with other Republicans	Polarization	-0.019	0.056	0.738	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Huddy Partisan Identity	(-) Partisan Identity: Lot in common with other supporters	Polarization	-0.053	0.062	0.397	1.000	0.988	FALSE
Post-Treatment Fox News Viewership	INDEX: Self-reported Reduced Post-Treatment Fox News Viewership		-0.007	0.047	0.881	1.000	NA	NA
Post-Treatment Fox News Viewership	(-) Fox Min Watched Per Week During Treatment Period	Post-Treatment Viewership	-0.006	0.061	0.920	1.000	0.969	TRUE
Post-Treatment Fox News Viewership	(-) Post-Treatment Viewership of Fox Shows During Incentivized Hours	Post-Treatment Viewership	-0.022	0.082	0.789	1.000	0.969	TRUE
Racial Prejudice	INDEX: Reduced Racial Prejudice		-0.032	0.042	0.452	1.000	NA	NA
Racial Prejudice	Feeling therm: Blacks	Racial Prejudice	-0.021	0.064	0.745	1.000	0.786	FALSE
Racial Prejudice	Feeling therm: The Black Lives Matter movement	Racial Prejudice	-0.034	0.056	0.539	0.895	0.786	TRUE
Second Order Beliefs	INDEX: Second Order Beliefs about Liberalism of Average American		0.000	0.063	0.997	1.000	NA	NA
Second Order Beliefs	(-) Ideological placement: The Average American	Partisan Attitudes	0.000	0.063	0.997	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Substitute news source use	INDEX: Self-reported Substitute News Source Use		0.002	0.047	0.968	1.000	NA	NA

Table OA10: Effect on Endline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
Substitute news source use	Local TV use during treatment period	Substitute news source use	0.088	0.104	0.402	1.000	0.995	FALSE
Substitute news source use	cnn.com use during treatment period	Substitute news source use	0.074	0.072	0.303	1.000	0.986	FALSE
Substitute news source use	Local newspaper use during treatment period	Substitute news source use	0.070	0.116	0.547	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Substitute news source use	Breitbart use during treatment period	Substitute news source use	0.031	0.071	0.667	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Substitute news source use	Radio news use during treatment period	Substitute news source use	0.022	0.109	0.837	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Substitute news source use	Twitter use during treatment period	Substitute news source use	0.010	0.106	0.921	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Substitute news source use	Facebook use during treatment period	Substitute news source use	-0.004	0.071	0.958	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Substitute news source use	foxnews.com use during treatment period	Substitute news source use	-0.030	0.071	0.670	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Substitute news source use	One America News use during treatment period	Substitute news source use	-0.033	0.072	0.645	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Substitute news source use	News discussions with friends and family during treatment period	Substitute news source use	-0.088	0.071	0.215	1.000	0.966	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	INDEX: Reduced Trump Evaluation		0.006	0.030	0.842	1.000	NA	NA
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trump evaluation: Managing the coronavirus pandemic	Partisan Attitudes	0.079	0.060	0.189	1.000	0.994	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trait rating: Trump honest	Partisan Attitudes	0.076	0.054	0.161	1.000	0.989	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	Ideological distance from self: President Donald Trump	Partisan Attitudes	0.072	0.062	0.251	1.000	0.998	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trump evaluation: The environment and climate change	Partisan Attitudes	0.068	0.060	0.259	1.000	0.998	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trump evaluation: Encouraging good relationships between different racial groups in the US	Partisan Attitudes	0.063	0.061	0.299	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trump evaluation: Encouraging Americans to stay safe from and not spread the coronavirus	Partisan Attitudes	0.058	0.058	0.318	1.000	0.999	FALSE

Table OA10: Effect on Endline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
Trump Evaluation	(-) Feeling therm: President Donald Trump	Partisan Attitudes	0.034	0.046	0.456	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	Trait rating: Trump selfish	Partisan Attitudes	0.013	0.060	0.828	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trait rating: Trump patriotic	Partisan Attitudes	-0.001	0.055	0.980	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trump evaluation: Respecting the military	Partisan Attitudes	-0.008	0.060	0.890	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trait rating: Trump intelligent	Partisan Attitudes	-0.021	0.060	0.726	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trump evaluation: Ensuring the election is fair and that people trust the results	Partisan Attitudes	-0.024	0.071	0.733	1.000	1.000	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	Trait rating: Trump mean	Partisan Attitudes	-0.039	0.057	0.493	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trump evaluation: Overseeing the development of a vaccine for the coronavirus	Partisan Attitudes	-0.076	0.090	0.396	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trump evaluation: Ensuring America does not get drawn into any unnecessary wars	Partisan Attitudes	-0.096	0.093	0.306	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Trump Evaluation	(-) Trump evaluation: Managing the economy	Partisan Attitudes	-0.118	0.090	0.190	1.000	0.994	FALSE
Trump Position Perceptions - CNN-Covered	INDEX: Increased Knowledge of CNN-Covered Trump Positions		0.067	0.025	0.008	0.230	NA	NA
Trump Position Perceptions - CNN-Covered	T/F: Back in February, Donald Trump admitted privately that he knew the coronavirus was much more deadly than the flu.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.122	0.096	0.206	1.000	0.976	FALSE
Trump Position Perceptions - CNN-Covered	Trump supports: Open America's public schools for in-person classes this fall.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.114	0.066	0.083	1.000	0.896	FALSE
Trump Position Perceptions - CNN-Covered	(-) Trump supports: Americans should wear masks in public.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.093	0.068	0.173	1.000	0.966	FALSE
Trump Position Perceptions - CNN-Covered	(-) Trump supports: All Americans should be allowed to vote by mail.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.067	0.073	0.358	1.000	0.989	FALSE
Trump Position Perceptions - CNN-Covered	(-) Trump supports: Increase taxes on corporations and wealthy people.	Perceptions of Current Events	0.066	0.067	0.329	1.000	0.989	FALSE

Table OA10: Effect on Endline Survey *(continued)*

Index	Item	Family	Effect	SE	p-val.	q-val.	W&Y p-val.	Item of Int.
Trump Position Perceptions - CNN-Covered	T/F: President Donald Trump referred to US soldiers who died in combat and are buried at the Aisne-Marne cemetery as ”losers” and ”suckers.”	Perceptions of Current Events	0.002	0.067	0.973	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Trump Position Perceptions - CNN-Covered	Trump supports: Repeal the law that prohibits insurance companies from charging people more if they have pre-existing medical conditions.	Perceptions of Current Events	-0.006	0.111	0.954	1.000	0.999	FALSE
Trump Position Perceptions - CNN-Covered	(-) T/F: Trump said that he would accept the results of the election if he is declared the loser.	Perceptions of Current Events	-0.076	0.071	0.283	1.000	0.988	FALSE

11.4 TV Viewership Data

The TV viewership data came from a media analytics company that linked the IP addresses of internet-connected televisions to household addresses and the voter file.

This data was necessary to conduct the experiment because, without it, it would have been impractical to locate a large enough sample of current Fox News viewers. However, although the viewership data appears to have succeeded in allowing us to recruit a sample that was much more likely to watch Fox News than the general population, the viewership data still contains substantial measurement error. In discussions with the media analytics company, this arises from two sources. First, the process which matches internet-connected televisions to voter file records contains some error. Second, households have multiple televisions, only some of which are captured in our data, meaning that the viewership data is likely to both undercount the true number of minutes watched and include viewership behavior from other household members.

This is why, to qualify for the experiment, individuals had to *both* be identified as likely Fox viewers in the viewership data *and* self-report watching a substantial amount of Fox News at baseline. Each of these sources has measurement error, but combining them allowed us to identify a final group for the experiment that would be very likely to actually watch Fox News. Consistent with our experimental subjects being by and large regularly Fox News viewers, as reported in the main paper, we found substantial treatment effects on a number of items related to content that was only present on Fox News.

At the same time, we would expect, and indeed find, that these sources of measurement error would lead us to substantially underestimate effects on the viewership outcomes themselves during the experiment. As an example of this, we estimate with the viewership data that the treatment group watched an additional 180 minutes of CNN during the incentivized period than the control group ($p < 0.001$). However, based on the quiz results, we believe this number to be higher. On average, individuals in the treatment group were incentivized to watch 5.9 hours per week of CNN for four weeks. The average treatment group respondent passed 4.1 out of 5 quizzes. If we assume the average treatment group respondent watched 80% of the CNN they were randomized to watch, then over the four week period, they would have watched 1,133 additional minutes of CNN compared to the 180 minutes we estimate from the viewership data (implying the viewership data only captures as little as approximately 16% of true viewership). This means that the viewership results are heavily attenuated towards zero.

Nevertheless, with these caveats in mind, below are the treatment effects on the television viewership data. We do not adjust these for multiple testing. Note that the incentivized period refers to the dates 2020-08-31 to 2020-09-25.

Table OA11: Effect on TV Viewership Data (log minutes)

Time Period	Network	Effect	SE	p-val
Incentivized Period	CNN	1.694	0.188	0.000
Oct.	CNN	0.055	0.094	0.555
Nov.	CNN	0.105	0.121	0.388
Incentivized Period	Fox News	-0.263	0.158	0.097
Oct.	Fox News	-0.174	0.165	0.291
Nov.	Fox News	-0.287	0.170	0.093
Incentivized Period	Total TV Viewership	-0.016	0.077	0.833
Oct.	Total TV Viewership	-0.076	0.083	0.360
Nov.	Total TV Viewership	-0.071	0.087	0.414

Table OA12: Effect on TV Viewership Data (raw minutes)

Time Period	Network	Effect	SE	p-val
Incentivized Period	CNN	180.022	27.795	0.000
Oct.	CNN	0.528	2.512	0.834
Nov.	CNN	6.440	5.828	0.270
Incentivized Period	Fox News	-26.959	103.125	0.794

Table OA12: Effect on TV Viewership Data (raw minutes) *(continued)*

Time Period	Network	Effect	SE	p-val
Oct.	Fox News	53.234	153.742	0.729
Nov.	Fox News	-64.951	138.785	0.640
Incentivized Period	Total TV Viewership	-23.467	196.238	0.905
Oct.	Total TV Viewership	-172.170	310.602	0.580
Nov.	Total TV Viewership	-383.416	316.707	0.227

11.5 Heterogenous Treatment Effects (HTEs) (Exploratory)

11.5.1 Pre-Registered HTEs

In the pre-analysis plan, we stated:

> Our main heterogenous treatment effect of interest is with respect to a binary variable coded as 1 if a person said in the baseline survey that the reason they watch Fox News is because "They share my point of view" and 0 otherwise.

This variable is `hte_pov` below, and is set to 1 if the person said they like watching Fox News because it shares their point of view and 0 otherwise.

We also wrote:

> We are particularly interested in heterogeneous treatment effects on the CNN Attitudes index, but this is of some interest across all the indices.

Given the large number of indices and individual items of interest, we subsequently decided to limit tihs analysis to only CNN Attitudes index. We did not look at any other results.

We also wrote:

> Because our sample is relatively homogenous on many baseline political dimensions, we do not have a priori strong expectations regarding heterogenous treatment effects by the other covariates that we measured. However, for strictly exploratory purposes only, we may compute heterogenous treatment effects by the following variables that we blocked on: num_hrs_incentivizing (Number of CNN hours assigned to watch / would have been assigned to watch (which was determined pre-treatment for all subjects)); baseline_partisan_factor; baseline_cnn_factor; baseline_fox_watch_factor
>
> We will look for HTEs by splitting the variables into terciles and calculating the conditional average treatment effects within each tercile of the variables named above. We will only plan to look for HTEs on indices and items listed as "Individual Item of Interest".

Given the large number of indices and individual items of interest, we subsequently decided not to investigate all of these potential heterogenous treatment effects (HTEs). Instead, we limit our HTE analysis to only `baseline_partisan_factor` and `baseline_fox_watch_factor` on the indices `t2_i_trump_evaluation` and `t2_i_attitudes_fox_covered`. We did not investigate any other HTEs. This is limited to only the midline survey. Given the exploratory nature of this analysis, we do not adjust for multiple comparisons.

We orient both variables such that higher values capture more conservative attitudes and more Fox News viewership. To provide more context, for the `baseline_partisan_factor`:

- Tercile 1 has an average baseline Trump thermometer rating of 64.1, an average Biden thermometer rating of 29.2, an average 7-point party identification of 2.6, and self-reported watching 1.5 hours yesterday and 622 minutes per week of Fox News.
- Tercile 2 has an average baseline Trump thermometer rating of 86.5, an average Biden thermometer rating of 11.7, an average 7-point party identification of 1.7, and self-reported watching 2.0 hours yesterday and 873 minutes per week of Fox News.

Tercile of Baseline Partisan Factor	Effect	SE	p-val.
Outcome = Trump Evaluation			
Tercile 1	0.111	0.054	0.042
Tercile 2	0.126	0.053	0.018
Tercile 3	-0.002	0.045	0.972
Outcome = Attitudes Fox Covered			
Tercile 1	0.147	0.060	0.015
Tercile 2	0.107	0.051	0.037
Tercile 3	0.131	0.048	0.007

Table OA13: Heterogenous Treatment Effects by Baseline Partisan Factor

Tercile of Baseline Fox Viewership Factor	Effect	SE	p-val.
Outcome = Trump Evaluation			
Tercile 1	0.138	0.052	0.008
Tercile 2	0.016	0.050	0.751
Tercile 3	0.177	0.051	0.001
Outcome = Attitudes Fox Covered			
Tercile 1	0.178	0.054	0.001
Tercile 2	0.128	0.058	0.029
Tercile 3	0.008	0.045	0.852

Table OA14: Heterogenous Treatment Effects by Baseline Fox Viewership Factor

- Tercile 3 has an average baseline Trump thermometer rating of 96.5, an average Biden thermometer rating of 3.5, an average 7-point party identification of 1.3, and self-reported watching 2.4 hours yesterday and 1030 minutes per week of Fox News.

For the `baseline_fox_watch_factor`:

- Tercile 1 has an average baseline Trump thermometer rating of 73.5, an average Biden thermometer rating of 18.8, an average 7-point party identification of 2.1, and self-reported watching 0.7 hours yesterday and 289 minutes per week of Fox News.
- Tercile 2 has an average baseline Trump thermometer rating of 83.8, an average Biden thermometer rating of 14.2, an average 7-point party identification of 1.8, and self-reported watching 1.6 hours yesterday and 701 minutes per week of Fox News.
- Tercile 3 has an average baseline Trump thermometer rating of 89.7, an average Biden thermometer rating of 11.5, an average 7-point party identification of 1.7, and self-reported watching 3.5 hours yesterday and 1534 minutes per week of Fox News.

The below table summarizes the results.

11.5.2 Can Priming Alone Explain The Results?

As we note in the main text, the mechanism for the effects we uncover is impossible to definitively determine. We suspect that the changes in information participants learned on each of the two networks (i.e., the consequences of partisan coverage filtering) is chiefly responsible for the effects we found. However, a potential alternative explanation

Watches Fox for Point of View	Effect	SE	p-val.
Outcome = CNN Attitudes			
Watches Fox for POV0	0.014	0.067	0.834
Watches Fox for POV1	0.027	0.046	0.553

Table OA15: Heterogenous Treatment Effects on CNN Attitudes, by Watches Fox for POV

Trichotomized Baseline Support for Protests	Effect	SE	p-val.
Outcome = Trump Evaluation			
Disapprove at Baseline	0.028	0.152	0.854
Neither at Baseline	0.105	0.121	0.387
Approve at Baseline	0.069	0.031	0.025
Outcome = Attitudes Fox Covered			
Disapprove at Baseline	0.194	0.231	0.406
Neither at Baseline	0.313	0.151	0.043
Approve at Baseline	0.142	0.031	0.000

Table OA16: Heterogenous Treatment Effects by Baseline Approval of Trump's Handling of COVID

for our findings is *priming* due to *agenda setting*—i.e., that participants simply hearing more about topics on which they have liberal opinions at baseline caused their overall attitudes to become more liberal, as these pre-existing liberal attitudes were primed by CNN's agenda-setting efforts. For example, did respondents evaluate Trump more negatively because their pre-existing dissatisfaction with his handling of COVID-19 became more top-of-mind (priming) due to CNN's greater coverage of COVID (agenda-setting)?

Although we cannot rule out that this priming alternative contributes to the results, we can conduct a test of whether priming alone can entirely explain the results. In particular, the classic test for media priming is to examine how effects of consuming media vary by the baseline attitude being primed. In our data, we therefore test how some of our mind findings differ by baseline attitudes capturing people's views about topics that were extensively covered on Fox and CNN during the intervention.

From this vantage point, it should be noted at the outset that the composition of the sample we examine makes priming ex ante unlikely. As detailed above, the sample for the experiment began with strongly conservative attitudes, making it unlikely that priming any particular dimension would liberalize their attitudes; they have conservative attitudes on every dimension. However, we can examine this in more detail on particular attitudes dimensions.

First, since COVID-19 represented by far the most commonly discussed topic on CNN, we examine whether the effects are due to respondent's pre-existing views towards Trump's handling of COVID-19 being primed. The baseline survey asked "Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?", with one of the statements being "Donald Trump has done a good job handling the coronavirus pandemic." The response options were "Strongly agree", "Somewhat agree", "Neither agree nor disagree", "Somewhat disagree", and "Strongly disagree". We group the two "agree" and "disagree" responses together so there are three categories: those who approved of Trump's handling of COVID-19 at baseline ($n = 645$), those who neither approve nor disapprove ($n = 59$), and those who disapproved ($n = 40$).

Table OA16 shows the effects by whether respondents approved of Trump's handling of COVID-19 at baseline. As in the above analyses, we examine effects on two dependent variables, post-treatment (midline) evaluations of Trump and post-treatment (midline) attitudes towards the events that Fox News covered. Were priming to solely account for the findings, we would expect the effects to be limited to the subset of the sample that did not approve of Trump's handling of COVID-19 at baseline, whose negative attitudes on this dimension were then primed. We might even expect those who approved of Trump's handling of COVID-19 at baseline to approve of him more often after the treatment if this dimension were primed. This is not what we find. Table OA16 finds that the effects on Trump evaluation are actually smallest for those who disapproved of Trump's handling of COVID-19 at baseline, and are clearly present for those who approved of Trump's handling of COVID-19 at baseline. The second half of the table shows that the effects on attitudes towards events Fox covered are similar for all three categories, although only statistically significant among those who supporting Trump's handling at baseline, the largest group.

Since the intervention involved switching respondents away from consuming Fox News, it is also possible that the intervention could have had its effects by *reducing* the salience of issues related to protests against police violence, which were, as shown above, by far the most common topic on Fox News. Were priming to drive the results, we would therefore expect the effects to the limited to those who opposed the protests at baseline. This was most of the sample: at baseline, 654 people did not agree that they supported the recent protests against the police (i.e., opposed the protests), 45 neither agreed nor disagreed, and 44 agreed that they supported them. However, Table OA17 shows that the effects remain statistically significant, albeit imprecisely estimated, among those who actually supported the

Trichotomized Baseline Support for Protests	Effect	SE	p-val.
Outcome = Trump Evaluation			
Supportive	0.400	0.174	0.026
Neither	0.462	0.197	0.024
Opposed	0.080	0.030	0.008
Outcome = Attitudes Fox Covered			
Supportive	0.337	0.174	0.059
Neither	0.338	0.215	0.123
Opposed	0.129	0.030	0.000

Table OA17: Heterogenous Treatment Effects by Baseline Support for Protests

protests at baseline.

Tables OA16 and OA17 therefore suggest that priming is not driving the results. Priming entails holding constant one's evaluation of a politican or an issue on a certain dimension and merely changing the weight assigned to that dimension. Yet, if the treatment simply changed the weight respondents placed on protests or COVID-19 and worked through no other mechanism, we should not have seen the pattern of results we did above, with those who supported Trump's actions on COVID-19 still being affected by the treatment despite CNN's greater coverage of this issue, and those who supported the protests against police still being affected by the treatment despite them consuming less Fox News during this time. Taken together, then, although these results do not rule out some role for priming, especially among respondents who were more moderate or left-leaning at baseline, these results suggest priming is unlikely to be responsible for driving the preponderance of the effects we find.

One potential alternative explanation is that events outside the experiment changed respondents' attitudes between the baseline and the follow-up survey, and that these changed attitudes were then primed by the treatment. For example, a rising COVID caseload during September 2020 could have changed attitudes towards Trump's handling of COVID, which in turn the treatment could have primed. Were this the case, we would expect to see attitudes in the control group change between the baseline survey in August and the endline survey in September. Given that this is such a short time period, we would not expect meaningful changes in respondents' attitudes. And indeed, examining items that appeared on both the baseline and endline survey, we find no meaningful changes over time in the control group. (Note that the treatment changing those attitudes would not be a case of priming, that would be an instance of the treatment changing attitudes not priming them.)

12 Transcript Analysis During Incentivized Period

To conduct the transcript analysis, we first provided a research assistant with a list of statements (see the below table). The research assistant then read the weeknight (7-11 PM ET) Fox and CNN to locate coverage of these statements. If a statement was discussed, the research assistant then copied any quotes directly relevant to that statement into a spreadsheet. We then counted the number of words in those quotes as a measure of media attention to that statement.

12.1 Word Counts by Topic and Subtopic

Table OA18 shows the total counts of words for each statement by network. The final column is the ratio of Fox coverage to CNN coverage. If CNN did not cover this statement (a 0 value), then this ratio is infinity.

Topic	Subtopic (I.e., Information)	Total CNN Words	Total Fox Words	Fox:CNN Ratio
Race/Protests	Biden position on tearing down statues	0	104	Inf
Economy/Taxes	Biden position on government spending	0	313	Inf
Election Integrity	Mueller investigation: negative coverage (e.g., bias, witch hunt)	0	1619	Inf
Election Integrity	Trump will accept election results	0	101	Inf
2020 Election	Biden embracing far left	236	5187	21.98
Other	Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain recently signed a Middle East peace deal at the White House.	84	1278	15.21
Other	Global warming / climate change is NOT a problem	116	1739	14.99
COVID	Democratic elites violating COVID restrictions	209	2464	11.79
Race/Protests	Biden/Democrats support for extreme racial ideology/protests	1300	15236	11.72
2020 Election	Biden is NOT the favorite to win the Presidential election (e.g., polls are tied)	107	1085	10.14
Race/Protests	Negative consequences of extreme racial ideology/protests (e.g., violence)	1712	15003	8.76
Economy/Taxes	Biden position: Increase taxes on corporations and wealthy people.	44	234	5.32
Race/Protests	Trump's actions to advance racial equality	1186	5172	4.36
Election Integrity	Russa has NOT interfered to help Trump	46	190	4.13
COVID	Information downplaying severity of COVID-19	1332	5477	4.11
Healthcare (non-COVID)	Biden position on Medicare for All/expansion	96	311	3.24
Race/Protests	Racism is not a problem in US	854	2504	2.93
Election Integrity	Mail-in voting susceptible to fraud	1507	3242	2.15
COVID	Trump's actions to protect US from COVID-19	1695	3538	2.09
Race/Protests	Trump opposed to extreme racial ideology	942	1892	2.01
COVID	Description of Trump actions on COVID	178	317	1.78
Race/Protests	Biden condemnation of extreme racial ideology/protests	886	1405	1.59
Race/Protests	Trump condemning own supporters' extreme tactics	0	0	1.00
Election Integrity	Mueller investigation: positive coverage	0	0	1.00
Economy/Taxes	Trump position on taxes	49	49	1.00
2020 Election	RNC anti-Semitic speakers	0	0	1.00
Healthcare (non-COVID)	Trump position on pre-existing condition protections	0	0	1.00
Economy/Taxes	Trump paying only $750 in taxes in 2016	0	0	1.00
Race/Protests	Reporting on existence of BLM protests	2693	2136	0.79
Race/Protests	Jacob Blake was armed with knife	869	581	0.67
Other	Trump offensive comments about fallen soldiers	844	465	0.55
2020 Election	Biden is the favorite to win the Presidential election	455	201	0.44
COVID	Trump's position on in-person schooling	270	91	0.34
Election Integrity	Descriptions of voting by mail	1415	424	0.30
Race/Protests	Rittenhouse, 17-year-old who killed at Kenosha protest, is Trump supporter	183	47	0.26
Other	Global warming / climate change is a problem	1793	427	0.24
Race/Protests	Racism is a problem in US	4652	872	0.19
Race/Protests	Trump not condemning far-right extremists	2020	243	0.12
Election Integrity	Trump will not accept election results	1947	212	0.11
COVID	Trump's failures to protect US & his supporters from COVID-19	21244	2086	0.10
COVID	Trump's opposition to mask-wearing	3232	283	0.09
Election Integrity	Russia intervening to help Trump, undermine confidence in election	2923	254	0.09
Race/Protests	Supportive comments about BLM protests	715	56	0.08
Election Integrity	Mail-in voting is secure	4606	342	0.07
Race/Protests	Trump comment about looters/thugs on planes to Floyd protests	1993	138	0.07
COVID	Information indicating severity of COVID-19	10251	709	0.07
2020 Election	Former military/national security leaders, former Republican leaders praising/endorsing Joe Biden	1487	97	0.07
Election Integrity	Trump position on vote-by-mail	2559	102	0.04

Table OA18: Word Count of Statements Covered by Network (Aug 31 - 25 Sept)

12.2 Topic Areas

We also group subtopics into their overall topic areas. The below figure shows how topics vary by network.

Figure OA17: Topic Areas by Network



12.3 Item-Level Relationship Between Effects at Midline and CNN/Fox Coverage Content

We conducted an exploratory analysis to test whether we observe larger treatment effects on issues that FNC and CNN covered more (as measured using the word count from our transcript analysis) than on issues they covered less.

This analysis was not pre-registered and our transcript analysis was not conducted with this analysis in mind.

To conduct this analysis, we first mapped survey outcome measures to the topics included in our transcript analysis (e.g., the survey measure "The coronavirus causes many people to experience serious long-term health problems that stay with them for months or longer" was mapped to the transcript code "Information on or emphasis of the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g., infection rate, long COVID facts, number of deaths)"). We mapped some survey measures to multiple topics (e.g., the survey measure "Democrats are trying to steal the election with fraudulent mail-in ballots" was mapped to "Voting by Mail Negative Coverage (fraud, etc.)" and "Voting by Mail Positive Coverage (safe, etc.)"). In these cases, we added up the total words from each topic. In cases where a single topic in the transcript analysis mapped to multiple survey measures, we evenly distributed those word counts across the different survey measures.

Figure OA18 shows the precision-weighted correlation between treatment effect estimates and the amount of coverage that survey measure received on FNC and CNN, combined, during the incentivized period. For the non-COVID items, we find a positive relationship, suggesting that we observe larger treatment effects on those measures that received more coverage. However, for the COVID items, we observe no relationship. This could be related to measurement error in the COVID items, as mapping the survey measures to the transcript analysis was more difficult than the non-COVID items.

Figure OA18: Relationship Between Coverage Volume and Treatment Effect Estimates



13 Horowitz-Manski Bounds

Given the small amount of average differential attrition we observe (overall attrition rate was 2.5%) and the lack of differential attrition by pre-treatment covariates, as a conservative robustness test, we also report Horowitz and Manski (1998) extreme value bounds, which present a very "worst case" scenario. These bounds are fairly rarely presented in applied work as, typically, "the bounds are wide" Gerber and Green (2012) (p. 224) that they are essentially uninformative. However, due to our low overall survey attrition rate, in this case many of our findings survive even when accounting for this very "worst case" scenario.

In particular, the lower bound is calculated by replacing the missing outcome values in the treatment [control] group with the lowest [highest] observed value for that measure. We then repeat our covariate selection procedure on this new measure and estimate a lower bound for a treatment effect. The upper bound is similarly calculated by first replacing the missing outcome values in the treatment [control] group with the highest [lowest] observed value for that measure.

Figure OA19 reports these Horowitz-Manski bounds. The black point and error bars are the original point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the estimated treatment effect reported in the main text, ignoring attrition. The dark grey error bars present the lower and upper bounds of the Horowitz-Manski bounds, only taking into account identification uncertainty from the attrition. That is, it plots the range from the lower bound point estimate to the upper bound point estimate. The light grey error bars are Horowitz-Manski bounds that take into account both identification and sampling uncertainty. That is, it plots the range from the lower end of the lower 95% confidence interval to the upper end of the upper 95% confidence interval.

Despite the Horowitz-Manski bounds being quite wide, as usual (Gerber and Green, 2012), the substantive findings we report in the main text are robust to this conservative approach to bounding the average treatment effect estimate. In particular, the treatment effect estimates we report in the main text that are statistically significant (q's < 0.05) remain statistically significant after taking into account identification uncertainty from the attrition. However, after accounting for sampling variability, the bounds are generally too wide to be informative, a common feature of Horowitz-Manski bounds.

Figure OA19: Horowitz-Manski Bounds



14 Additional Appendix Figures and Tables

Figure OA20: Treatment Effect on Current Event Perceptions During Incentivized Period (Individual Items)



Notes: Standard errors (thick lines) and 95% confidence intervals (thin) surround point estimates. See Table OA7 for numerical estimates. q is the FDR sharpened q-value (Anderson, 2008) and p_{wy} is the FWER adjusted p-value (Westfall and Young, 1993).

Figure OA21: Treatment Effect on Attitudes Towards Events During Incentivized Period (Individual Items)



Notes: Standard errors (thick lines) and 95% confidence intervals (thin) surround point estimates. See Table OA7 for numerical estimates. q is the FDR sharpened q-value (Anderson, 2008) and p_{wy} is the FWER adjusted p-value (Westfall and Young, 1993).

Table OA19: Effect on Example Dichotomized Items

Variable Name	Control (Fox) Mean	Treatment (CNN) Mean	Treatment Effect	Standard Error	Item Wording	Coding
t2_selfview_biden_blm_shot	0.634	0.504	-0.130	0.033	Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? If Joe Biden is elected President, we'll see many more police get shot by Black Lives Matter activists.	1 = Somewhat or strongly agree; 0 = otherwise (neither agree/disagree or disagree)
q2_truefalse_blake_armed	0.804	0.678	-0.126	0.034	Below are several statements. Some statements below are completely true. Others are at least partly false. Some are completely false. Which of the below statements do you think are completely true? If you think part of the statement is false, select false. If you don't know, just make your best guess. Jacob Blake, who was recently shot by police in Kenosha, Wisconsin, was armed with a knife and had engaged in a violent struggle with officers moments before officers shot him.	1 = I think this is COMPLETELY TRUE; 0 = I think this is FALSE
q2_selfview_protests_blake	0.753	0.637	-0.115	0.033	Do you agree or disagree with the statements below? It is an overreaction to go out and protest in response to the police shooting of Jacob Blake in Kenosha, Wisconsin.	1 = Somewhat or strongly agree; 0 = otherwise (neither agree/disagree or disagree)
t2_selfview_biden_elect_protes	0.600	0.486	-0.114	0.036	Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? If Joe Biden is elected President, the protests in America's cities will only get more violent.	1 = Somewhat or strongly agree; 0 = otherwise (neither agree/disagree or disagree)
t2_trump_eval_safe_covid	0.383	0.273	-0.110	0.032	How would you evaluate President Trump's performance in these areas? Encouraging Americans to stay safe from and not spread the coronavirus	1 = performed somewhat or way above expectations; 0 = at or below expectations
t2_agenda_covid_vs_blm	0.512	0.398	-0.113	0.049	On a scale of 1 to 10, what problem do you think it is more important for the President to focus on, the coronavirus pandemic (1), violent protests (10), or somewhere in between?	6-10 = 1 (violent protests more important than COVID); 1-5 = 0 (COVID at least as important as violent protests)

Table OA19: Effect on Example Dichotomized Items *(continued)*

Variable Name	Control (Fox) Mean	Treatment (CNN) Mean	Treatment Effect	Standard Error	Item Wording	Coding
t2_truefalse_trump_rally_safe	0.579	0.476	-0.104	0.034	Which of the below statements do you think are completely true? If you think part of the statement is false, select false. If you don't know, just make your best guess. Donald Trump's campaign is taking significant safety precautions at its rallies to reduce the risk that rally attendees spread the coronavirus to each other.	1 = I think this is COMPLETELY TRUE; 0 = I think this is FALSE
t2_selfview_biden_sup_pol_shot	0.567	0.464	-0.103	0.034	Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? I think many Biden supporters are probably happy to see it when police officers get shot.	1 = Somewhat or strongly agree; 0 = otherwise (neither agree/disagree or disagree)
t2_issue_trump_masks	0.631	0.533	-0.098	0.030	If you had to guess, where do you think Republican Donald Trump stands on each of these proposals? Americans should wear masks in public.	1 = Trump supports; 0 = Trump opposes or not sure
t2_selfview_dem_steal_election	0.788	0.695	-0.093	0.027	Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Democrats are trying to steal the election with fraudulent mail-in ballots.	1 = Somewhat or strongly agree; 0 = otherwise (neither agree/disagree or disagree)
q4_selfview_covid_infecting_ma	0.412	0.498	0.086	0.034	Do you agree or disagree with the statements below? The coronavirus is still infecting huge numbers of Americans every day.	1 = Somewhat or strongly agree; 0 = otherwise (neither agree/disagree or disagree)
t2_issueview_votebymail	0.175	0.244	0.069	0.026	State and national leaders have debated many important issues recently. For each of the following, tell us whether you agree or disagree with the statement in principle States should allow voters to vote by mail in the 2020 election.	1 = Somewhat or strongly agree; 0 = otherwise (neither agree/disagree or disagree)
t2_issue_biden_policefund	0.391	0.333	-0.058	0.030	If you had to guess, where do you think Democrat Joe Biden stands on each of these proposals? Eliminate all funding for the police.	1 = Joe Biden supports; 0 = Joe Biden opposes or not sure

Table OA19: Effect on Example Dichotomized Items *(continued)*

Variable Name	Control (Fox) Mean	Treatment (CNN) Mean	Treatment Effect	Standard Error	Item Wording	Coding
t2_trump_eval_race_relation	0.481	0.423	-0.058	0.032	How would you evaluate President Trump's performance in these areas? Encouraging good relationships between different racial groups in the US	1 = performed somewhat or way above expectations; 0 = at or below expectations
t2_covid_other_countries	0.154	0.210	0.056	0.025	Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic? Many other countries have done a much better job of controlling the coronavirus than the United States government.	1 = Somewhat or strongly agree; 0 = otherwise (neither agree/disagree or disagree)
t2_covid_longterm	0.454	0.506	0.052	0.032	Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic? The coronavirus causes many people to experience serious long-term health problems that stay with them for months or longer.	1 = Somewhat or strongly agree; 0 = otherwise (neither agree/disagree or disagree)
t2_news_eval_fox_trump_bad	0.874	0.822	-0.051	0.023	Do you agree or disagree with the below statements? If Donald Trump did something bad, Fox News would discuss it.	1 = Somewhat or strongly agree; 0 = otherwise (neither agree/disagree or disagree)

Note:

The Table shows the effects on some of the items with the largest point estimates when those items are dichotomized to make the results more interpretable. This was not pre-registered. We offer these estimates to help aid interpretability.

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